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The Securitization of European Union Immigration Policy:  
A Warranted Response to International Terrorism? 
 
Veera Eleonoora Enlund 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the phenomenon of securitization in European Union immigration 
and asylum policy. It seeks to analyze the nature and origins of the externalization of 
threat in the context of safeguarding Europe’s internal security. It explores the extent to 
which the rhetoric of securitization has been utilized in the development of migration 
policies since the attacks of 9/11. Through policy and discourse analysis, it explores the 
institutionalization of securitization within the main bodies of the European Union. The 
thesis shows that national security provisions in immigration legislation has enabled the 
near militarization of the external borders of the Union and compromised human rights 
obligations towards non-EU citizens. The research presented reveals however that 
securitization did not considerably accelerate after the infamous terrorist attacks on 
European soil. This leads to the conclusion that the trend of securitization is not entirely 
new but has roots in the wider objectives of the European Union. Nevertheless, the 
thesis concludes that securitization is apparent in both EU discourse and policy to 
questionable levels under the pretext of preserving internal security of the Union. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
	  
1.1 - Overview of the thesis 
	  
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, a first of 
its magnitude aimed against civilians in the West, a war was declared, not against a 
state, but the non-state phenomenon of terrorism. Fears of similar attacks on the 
European continent materialized most prominently with the 2004 Madrid and 2005 
London attacks. Although terrorism is not by any means a new phenomenon in Europe, 
the attacks by Islamic fundamentalists escalated the debate on new forms of security 
threats post Cold War. It also illustrated, as Leiken (2004:206) points out, how obsolete 
the differentiation between the zone of stability and arc of conflict had become. For 
many, immigration was labeled as the channel via which instability was being imported 
to Europe. With a heightened terrorism alert throughout Europe, nationals from the 
Middle East and foreigners in general, were labeled as the source of this threat from the 
outside, on the freedoms, values and ultimately lives of people in Europe. 
Unfortunately, this atmosphere has continued to exist. 
In light of such developments, this thesis will aim to assess whether such 
externalization of threat has had implications on the European Union’s (EU) 
immigration and asylum policy towards third-country nationals (TCNs). More 
specifically, the aim is to examine the extent to which national security concerns dictate 
policy formation in the field of immigration and asylum. The precise focus of the 
research will be to analyze the phenomenon of securitization in the EU immigration and 
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asylum policy. Analysis will concentrate specifically on the time-period post 9/11, 
looking at the resultant discourse and policy implications on immigration policy 
concerning TCNs entry to the EU via legal and illegal channels. Hence, the objective of 
the thesis is to explore the use of security logic as a legitimating factor for tightening 
migration policies at the Union level. 
 
1.2 - Research question and methodology 
 
In the context of the above introduction, this thesis will aim to tackle the 
following research question: To what extent has EU migration policy been securitized 
as a result of new forms of security threats? The importance of the research question 
stems from the need to explore the ramifications of the 21st century security threats from 
non-state actors on the ideals of the EU.  The research question is hoped to highlight the 
paradox between the development of the internal liberalization of borders and the 
reinforcement of the external borders of Europe. Furthermore, the topic is of current 
interest amidst raising anti-immigration sentiments, arguably at the lead of growing 
right-wing political parties, on a continent in financial turmoil. Due to the topical nature 
of the immigration debate in Europe, this research aims to contribute to the field of 
study by examining the extent to which immigration is being discussed in the security 
context and the influence of non-state threats policy formation. In this context, the 
research also touches on the issue of externalizing or framing of a threat for the 
preservation of national identities.  
The methodology of the research will focus on analyzing the framework, which 
determines the selection and admission of foreign nationals and the restrictions on 
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illegal entry into the EU. Hence the research is limited specifically to the admissions 
framework, the legal or illegal entry and involuntary or voluntary exit of TCNs from the 
EU, and will not cover issues post admission such as integration and participatory rights 
in host country. 
Three main sections will form the foundation of the analysis. The first section 
provides an extensive literature review and theoretical context of the topic. This will 
entail a comprehensive analysis of the characteristics and features of securitization 
providing the necessary basis for the analysis for the following sections. Key words and 
themes identified in the theoretical framework will act as the reference points for the 
analysis of the primary data. 
The second part of the study will focus analysis on the policy outputs by the EU. 
The subject of analysis will be secondary legislation adopted by the EU, more 
specifically, Directives, Regulations and Decisions. Although all three constitute 
secondary legislation, each performs a slightly different function. Regulations constitute 
law, which is directly applicable in each member state and fully binding. It is applied in 
each member state of the Union without any additional measures on the national level 
(European Union 2011a). Directives on the other hand are mainly designed to align 
national legislation. Although binding, they allow for variation in the practice and 
method used to apply the Directive within national legislation. Decisions act as rulings 
on particular issues to either enact obligations or award rights to member states or 
citizens (European Union 2011a). These three are chosen due to their function as the 
main binding instruments under Union treaties and international agreements, the 
primary legislation of the EU. Primary legislation is not seen applicable to the analysis 
as it provides the fundamentals for the overall functioning of the EU, rather than 
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specific instruments used for detailed policymaking. Non-binding instruments, namely 
Recommendations, will however be taken into consideration in the analysis of the 
amendments and recasts of individual policies. This is necessary in order to gain an 
exhaustive understanding of the rationale behind specific policy developments and to 
see the full evolution of the legislation.  
The secondary legislation will be tackled in three broad categories: (1) asylum, 
(2) illegal entry and border reinforcement and (3) technology and data solutions. 
Although a variety of issues fall under migration policy, these subject areas have been 
chosen based on a comprehensive review on legislation as well as secondary literature. 
The categories cover the most central aspects of EU migration policy concerning TCNs 
and have undergone the highest amount of transformations within the time period in 
question. Whilst acknowledging that the standard legislative procedure within the EU 
involves the three main bodies, the European Parliament, the Council of the European 
Union and the European Commission, the focus of this chapter will be the European 
Commission as the executive body responsible for both the proposition and 
implementation of legislation.  
The third section will be a discourse analysis focused on the Meeting 
Conclusions published by the Council of the European Union and Reports published by 
the European Parliament from September 2001 until September 2011. Within this time 
period a total of 56 Council Conclusions were issued out of which 24 were chosen for 
closer analysis based on the relevance of their content. This section will cover the 
discourse aspect of the concept of securitization. The methodology will involve 
examining Meeting Conclusions related to immigration and analyzing the content, 
paying special attention to the wording and approach of the Council to different matters 
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pertaining to migration. It will be examined whether the Council discourse on 
immigration is occurring in the context of national or internal security and the way in 
which migration issues are framed and presented to the public. The Council has been 
chosen, over the other bodies, due to its role in the EU to provide “...the Union with the 
necessary impetus for its development and defines the general political directions and 
priorities thereof”  (European Union 2011b). Here the key is the emphasis on its role as 
the influence and the force, which shapes the development of the Union policies. This 
function ties in with speech aspect of the securitization concept developed later in the 
thesis. Furthermore, the Council does not retain any legislative functions hence 
separating the speech and policy aspects of analysis. In addition, the composition of the 
institution is seen most appropriate for the purpose of the analysis, as it is arguably the 
most politicized of the Union institutions due to its composition of the heads of states 
and key ministries of member states. It is hence believed that analyzing the Conclusions 
issued by the Council will be of most value for the aim of this thesis with regard to the 
discourse analysis.  
The second part of the discourse analysis will involve analysis of European 
Parliament Reports. The European Parliament is chosen as a counterbalance to the 
analysis of the Council for its differing function within the Union. The parliament plays 
a crucial role in scrutinizing draft EU legislation and other documents (European Union 
2011c). It checks Commission reports, gives its opinion on the topics on the agenda for 
European Council summits and reviews petitions from the citizens (European Union 
2011c). Hence, in a sense the European Parliament acts as a watchdog over the 
Commission and the Council. By analyzing these reports, it is hoped to gain insight into 
whether the Parliament is critically evaluating the direction of Union policy on 
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immigration and asylum. And further, whether the rhetoric used by the Parliament 
illustrates full regard to human rights, or has in fact the securitized rhetoric reached the 
general rational of the Parliament.  
The criteria for the selection of the Parliament reports was based on a document 
search on the European Parliament website under the public register for all Parliament 
Reports. The reports were filtered from 11 September 2001 to 16 September 2011, with 
a keyword search including the phrases “immigration” and “asylum”. This led to 358 
published reports out of which based on subject headings and extracts, the analysis was 
narrowed down to 32 reports. Based on the content matching the discussion to the 
Council and Commission documents already analyzed in the previous chapters, eight 
reports were considered to be of most relevance and are analyzed in great detail in the 
chapter. 
Hence, the overall time frame for the analysis is from September 2001 to the 
present day. Although Europe has a long history of terrorism, both from the inside, for 
instance the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna / Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) and the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), and from the outside, numerous aircraft hijackings by 
Palestinian revolutionaries in the 1970s, 9/11 marks the intensification of terrorist 
attacks or perceived threats on western soil. It instigated a period of heightened threats 
from non-state actors hence showing the nature of new security challenges. Taking into 
account potential bureaucratic delays in legislatives changes, the entire time-period 
between 2001 and 2011 will be looked at instead of specific points in time. This 
timeframe will also enable to reveal whether potential policy changes have been 
reactionary with short-term focus or a comprehensive long-term policy response.  
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1.3 - Map of the thesis 
	  
The thesis is divided into five chapters, the first of which provides the contextual 
background for the analysis. It also outlines the research question and methodology 
framing the research. The second chapter of the thesis tackles the institutional 
background and theoretical framework of the topic. The concept of securitization is then 
analyzed in detail, both its theoretical origins and its relevance in the context of 
immigration. This is followed by an extensive literature review in order to map out the 
existing analysis on links between immigration, terrorism and national security threats.  
Chapter three moves onto the policy analysis, aiming to find evidence of 
securitization in three main areas: asylum, illegal entry and border reinforcement and 
technology and data solutions. The chapter examines selected EU secondary legislation, 
chronologically analyzing trends and developments within the framework set in the 
literature review. The analysis looks for indications of the extent of securitization and 
whether such trend in legislation is new or an indication of a longstanding policy. 
Chapter four provides a comprehensive account on the discourse of the Council 
of the European Union through examining Meeting Conclusions and European 
Parliament Reports. The analysis goes through the central themes present in the 
conclusions and reports pertaining to migration issues. It examines the conclusions and 
reports in parallel in chronological order, grouping the documents according to their 
proximity to incidences of terrorism in Europe, in order to view any change in 
discourse. The chapter aims to see the manner in which the Council and Parliament 
approach the issue of migration and which aspects are held at a higher priority over 
others. 
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Chapter five summarizes the main arguments made in the thesis and focuses 
analysis on the general findings. The chapter concludes that although the securitization 
phenomenon is evident in the policies from the time period under study, they are not 
inherently new. Trends toward securitization have developed in parallel to the 
development and enlargement of the European Union. Due to the checks and balances 
present in the process of policy formation, it is unlikely that securitization will be taken 
to the extent of what is being witnessed in the US. For the EU, the securitization of 
immigration policy appears to be a reaction to its own internal development as much as 
to those on the outside of its borders. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
	  
2.1 - Introduction 
	  
This chapter will set the contextual and theoretical framework for the thesis. It 
will first briefly outline the key historical developments in EU migration policy. This is 
essential for the understanding of the framework under which the policy developments 
are occurring. Secondly, the chapter will tackle the theoretical background of the 
subject by examining the origins and foundation of the concept of securitization by the 
Copenhagen School. This will highlight the characteristics of securitization both as a 
speech act and as an institutionalized process. The research will then focus on 
examining the existing literature on securitization in the context of the migration debate 
in Europe. This will shed light on the prevailing perceptions on the roots of 
securitization in EU’s migration policy and the role, which the events of 9/11 played in 
its intensification. 
 
2.2. - An overview of EU migration policy  
	  
Immigration has enormous political, economic as well as social implications on 
the society of the receiving state. Technological advances, expansion of trade and rapid 
but unequal development have led to large movements of people seeking a better life 
both through legal and illegal channels. Furthermore, the increase of intra-state conflict 
and general state transformations following the end of the Cold War have led to 
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worldwide mass movements of people, having the potential to alter national stability as 
well as international security (Loescher 1992 in Huysmans 2006:15).  
The European Union, throughout its evolution, has highlighted the importance 
of bringing down barriers to international trade, restrictions on the mobility of labor 
being one of them. The Treaty of Rome of 1975, which established the European 
Economic Community (EEC), highlighted the importance of freedom of movement of 
labor (European Parliament 1975) and further on with the transformation of the EEC to 
the European Community (EC), the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 took the development of 
the Union further, realizing that open internal markets required the harmonization of 
other areas of policy making. This led to the three-pillar structure of the European 
Union: the EC, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA). With the widened scope of affairs, the Union reiterated the importance 
of “principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and of the rule of law” (European Council 1992:2). The 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam laid out foundations for immigration and asylum policy of the European 
Union, moving all aspects to do with the free movement of people to the EC pillar 
(European Communities 1997:28). Central immigration and asylum policy aspects such 
as issues of border crossing, visa requirements and rights of TCNs were outlined in the 
Treaty. In October 1999, another milestone in EU immigration policy, the Tampere 
meeting of the European Council concurred that “The separate but closely related issues 
of asylum and migration call for the development of a common EU policy” (European 
Parliament 1999:2). Tampere, pressing ahead with EU’s policy on JHA, put forward a 
five-year mandate for policy harmonization due to gap between policy statements and 
practice (Schain 2009:100). Tampere’s four main areas of emphasis were a) partnership 
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with countries of origin; b) a common European asylum system; c) fair treatment of 
third-country nationals; and d) management of migration flows (Balzacq and Carrera 
2005:5). The human rights emphasis was also strong, stating that “[t]he European Union 
must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally on the territory 
of its Member States. A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them 
rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens. It should also enhance non- 
discrimination in economic, social and cultural life and develop measures against 
racism and xenophobia” (European Parliament 1999:3).  
With the Treaty of Lisbon coming into force on 1st of December 2009, the 
Union experienced wide constitutional reform, also involving changes in the field of 
immigration and asylum. Issues of JHA previously under Title IV ‘Visas, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to free movement of person’ were re-titled to 
‘Area of freedom, security and justice’ and the earlier three-pillar structure became 
obsolete (European Union 2007:76). Most importantly, it introduced substantive 
changes to the legislative procedure. Prior to the Treaty, most JHA issues were under 
unanimity vote of the Council, with only consultative procedure with the European 
Parliament (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU 2009:2). The Treaty moved 
JHA issues under normal legislative procedure, expanding Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) procedure in the Council and full co-legislative powers with the European 
Parliament (General Secretariat of the Council of the EU 2009:2). However, key issues 
such as illegal immigration and asylum policy were already subject to QMV hence in 
terms of voting procedures there has already been a trend of increasing supranational 
power. One extensive change however is that all issues pertaining to migration, both EU 
and national level, are now subject to review by the European Court of Justice (General 
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Secretariat of the Council of the EU 2009:1). Hence, overall migration issues are 
subject to consultation by more parties than previously and in terms of voting, are easier 
to implement in the absence of unanimity vote.  
Throughout, the supranationalization of immigration and asylum in Union 
affairs has been a highly contested issue with national governments attempting to retain 
as much sovereignty as possible. Most illustrative of this has been the tug of war 
concerning QMV, as it had been planned to take effect already five years after the 
implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam (Balzacq and Carrera 2005:4-5). Hence 
national governments and influence groups continue to have a heavy weight on Union 
level policy-making. Bale (2008:316) also reiterates the importance of political parties 
on EU policy making over immigration as the nation-state is still seen to dominate over 
the field. Migration issues go to the core of issues of national sovereignty as well as 
identity making them highly controversial. 
 
2.3 - The Copenhagen School and the concept of securitization 
	  
As argued by Bigo (2000), the concept of security has dramatically changed 
over time. It is no longer solely something that involves the collective security of the 
state, but also the individual security of each person (Bigo 2000:328-329). Hence the 
emphasis has shifted from survival of the state as a collective entity in the international 
system of states, to also guaranteeing the security of the individual belonging to the 
state, regardless of their location in the world (Bigo 2000:329). This effectively has led 
to two transformations: the state taking responsibility for the security of the individual 
and widening the notion of security (Bigo 2000:329). Consequently, the security of the 
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individual has become has become a political issue. Issues previously concerning solely 
law enforcement have become matters of internal security and hence widely politicized 
(Bigo 2000:332). As a result, the expansion of the concept of security has led to the 
blurring of what constitutes international and what internal security. 
Consequently, the field of security studies within IR has become a debated topic, 
mainly through Constructivist challenges in a field typically dominated by Realist 
approaches. Constructivist critique has been aimed at the prevailing narrow definition of 
security concerned solely with state survival and military security (Williams 2003:512-
513). The debate in security studies, growing mainly between 1970s and 1980s, 
expected consideration for other actors such as sub-state groups and larger global 
concerns beyond that of the military (Williams 2003:513, Wæver 2004:7). The end of 
the Cold War, at the latest, marked the broadening of the notion of security (Den Boer 
2003:3). It was within this context of a larger movement to study the social construction 
of security that the concept of securitization was first put forward by the Copenhagen 
school.  
At the lead of Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, the Copenhagen School in security 
studies began to formulate around three main ideas: 1) securitization, 2) sectors and 3) 
regional security complexes (Wæver 2004:7). The sectors, as described by Wæver, can 
be divided into five different categories of security: political, environmental, economic, 
military and societal. Although each one is unique they are all linked illustrating a move 
away from traditional security sectors (Stone 2009:4). In addition to sectors, the 
Copenhagen School attests that there are three levels central to the analysis: the 
individual, the state and the international system (Stone 2009:3). Both the sectors and 
levels form a basis for the understanding of the broader notion of security. 
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The Copenhagen School describes the concept of securitization as a process 
whereby an issue is declared through speech acts to be a security problem and accepted 
as such by an audience (Stone 2009:8). As Williams (2003:514) aptly defines the 
concept; securitization is “structured by the differential capacity of actors to make 
socially effective claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims can be made 
in order to be recognized and accepted as convincing by the relevant audience, and by 
the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference”. 
Consequently, when an issue is securitized it is portrayed as a threat to existence of 
citizens of that state and hence extraordinary measures for safeguarding its survival are 
adopted moving above the realm of ‘normal politics’ (McDonald 2008:567). In other 
words, the way in which an issue is portrayed leads to justification for exceptional 
solutions to deal with the problem. This securitization aspect according to Wæver 
(2004:8) enables the state to use special powers, anti-democratic in nature, highlighting 
the Copenhagen School’s skepticism towards the concept of security. Illustrating the 
efficiency of securitization, Falah and Newman (1995:694) explain:  
“Leaders are successful in uniting the people around security matters more than 
any other issue—essentially because the appeal to national security is related directly to 
the issue of protection against a dangerous enemy and involves the physical survival of 
one’s family, friends and nation. The national threat is translated to reality at the 
micrological level”.  
 
The Copenhagen School is against such practice and believes that politics 
should be conducted according to normal procedures and in the long run strive for de-
securitization (Wæver 2004:8).  
In terms of the regional aspect of the analysis, Buzan led in developing the 
concept of the regional security complex in his book People, States and Fear (1981). 
According to Buzan, as security is a relational phenomenon “one cannot understand the 
	   15	  
national security of any given state without understanding the international pattern of 
security interdependence in which it is embedded” (quoted in Stone 2007:6). This 
applies to the securitization of issues on the regional level also. The Copenhagen School 
states that within a regional setting, such as the EU, the processes of securitization are 
interlinked to the extent that the security issues must be analyzed and resolved 
collectively (Wæver 2004:17).  
Hence, in the context of IR theory, the Copenhagen School does not accept the 
Realist concept of security but explores the social aspect of how threats are constructed 
(Stone 2009:2). In her analysis, Stone (2009:3) describes this approach to security as a 
combination of neoliberalism and constructivism. In contrast to Realism, the ‘struggle 
for power’ security setting is rejected as security is rather based on levels; individuals, 
states and international systems (Stone 2009:3). For Realism, security is dealt with from 
an objectivist approach, considering it to be something that is merely out there. The 
Copenhagen school considers security to exist from a moral choice and more 
importantly from human agency (Karyotis 2007:2-3). 
Although the Copenhagen School explains securitization as occurring through 
speech acts, the discourse has the ability to translate into policy practices and 
institutional developments (Karyotis 2007:3).  The Copenhagen School recognizes that 
over time the securitization of an issue can become institutionalized. This primarily 
happens when an issue is represented repeatedly as such and becomes normalized 
(Buzan et al. 1998:27-28).  Hence if an idea from speech acts has been institutionalized 
the idea of it is taken for granted and it will remain a reoccurring theme in the way the 
issue is dealt with within institutional practices. Bigo (2008:349) highlights in his 
research that institutionalization of discourse leads to the homogenization of the issue. 
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This institutionalization in turn necessitates power and legitimacy, which according to 
Bigo is gained by dominating insecurity (2008:25). Actors such as politicians, public 
and private bureaucracies develop the power to define the ‘legitimately recognized 
threats’ in order to create a security orientated outlook with the public (Bigo 2008:25). 
The audience or the public is led to believe that experts in the bureaucratic field possess 
knowledge on the on the issue of insecurity, transpiring as power (Bigo 2008:25). The 
Copenhagen School tackles institutionalization by making a distinction between 
institutionalized securitization and ad hoc securitization (Buzan et al. 1998:27). Ad hoc 
securitization is not yet part of standard political discourse, only when it becomes 
normalized and accepted by the public it can become institutionalized (Buzan et al. 
1998:28). Once institutionalized speech acts are less of importance and administrative 
and bureaucratic practices take over. 
 
2.4 - The securitization of immigration 
	  
Traditionally, migration was not a significant issue in European affairs, nor 
portrayed as a threat in any way (Larrabee 1992). After the Second World War, 
immigrant labor assisted in the reconstructing of a war torn Europe. However, following 
economic changes in the 1970s, European states began to implement restrictions on 
immigration (Karyotis 2007:3). In contrast to terrorist threats, the traditional security 
debate revolving around migration issues has focused on social and economic security 
(Spencer 2008:2). However, amid the increasingly aging population and negative 
population growth in many European countries, the literature reveals that on the eve of 
9/11 there was a trend towards liberalization of EU immigration policy due to 
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realization of pragmatic labor needs (Levy 2005:34, Karyotis 2007:1). This move 
towards a supportive stance on a more liberal immigration within the EU however was 
seemingly brought to a halt with the attacks of 9/11.  
Post 9/11, there is strong evidence in Europe of the population equating 
combatting terrorism with combatting illegal immigration and a more specifically 
adoption of more restrictive asylum policies (McDonald 2008, Spencer 2008, van 
Houtum and Pijpers 2007, Buzan 2006). For many, such as Leiken (2004:206) 
immigration was the means by which “the resentments of the Third World have struck 
back at the West in a way unparalleled in the previous periods of colonialism, Cold 
War, nationalism, and communism”. Leiken, along with many other US based scholars, 
viewed migration as a means by which violence was being exported to the West, calling 
for a response by Western governments (2004:206). This represents a way of 
externalizing a threat, differentiating between the “us” and the “them”. When examining 
what has actually enabled such externalization of threat, Coleman (2007) offers an 
explanation in the context of the nature of terrorism. As the origins of the threat of 
terrorism are largely unknown or unpredictable in nature, it has allowed for a wider and 
more comprehensive preventative approach, especially in the area of immigration 
(Coleman 2007:50-51). As there continues to be a lack of information concerning where 
the terrorist threat can originate from, states and policy makers are able to portray the 
“terrorists” as using all possible channels and means of entry into the state. Baldaccini 
(2007:xiv) supports this view by stating that immigration and asylum issues are 
especially vulnerable to exceptional measures than other subject areas of law. They are 
easily modified in terms of government interests, prioritizing the security of the citizens 
over that of the foreigner. For instance, the association of internal security and 
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immigration issues is evident even in the 2011 EU Terrorism and Situation Report 
(Europol 2011). Describing the current threat from terrorism, it states that “[t]he current 
and future flow of immigrants originating from North Africa could have an influence on 
the EU’s security situation. Individuals with terrorism aims could easily enter Europe 
amongst the large numbers of immigrants” (Europol 2011:6). 
For Bigo (2008:18-19), a widened concept of security in Europe has led to many 
unrelated issues to be placed in the same context. In the case of immigration and 
asylum, this is not often done directly but for instance administratively or in discourse 
linked to another traditional security issue, hence transferring the insecurity from one 
phenomena to another (Huysmans 2006:4). Such statements support arguments such as 
that of Guild (2003:4) who argues that constructing the foreigner as a threat has not 
only justified closure of borders and the expulsion of TCNs, but has also moved us 
away from commercial interests and human rights obligations. By portraying the TCN 
as a potential terrorist, xenophobia and arguably Islamophobia in Europe has visibly 
increased. According to Guild, this externalization post 9/11 has led to racial profiling 
of individuals as “the enemy” based on ethnicity and religious conviction rather than 
their nationality (Guild 2003:4). Correspondingly this has increased the cohesiveness of 
the European identity by reinforcing perceptions of the “other” (Karyotis 2007:9). The 
rising popularity of populist right-wing political parties using the anti-immigration 
platform has been captured in the analysis of many scholars (Van der Brug and 
Fennema 2009, Bale 2008). But more often, a direct link between immigration and 
terrorism is made by US based think tanks and scholars, Robert Leiken being the most 
prominent in labeling first and second generation immigrants being the source of 
terrorism in the West (Leiken 2005, Leiken 2004). This has also led to many scholars 
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highlighting the interdependence of European security and US security and conveying 
the message of US policymakers that a relaxed attitude towards immigration in Europe 
is a direct source of concern for global fight against terrorism (Kitfield 2010, Lugna 
2006, Leiken 2005, Leiken 2004). The view of European immigration policy being the 
weak link of global security as a whole, is adopted by the US government to the extent 
that in 2009 the CIA allocated approximately 40 percent of its counterterrorism funds in 
investigating suspected terrorists originating from the United Kingdom (Kitfield 2010) 
However, research has also developed around the argument that the trend of 
securitization of European migration policy was not brought on by 9/11 (Karyotis 2007, 
Boswell 2006). Karyotis argues in his article European Migration Policy in the 
Aftermath of September 11: The security-migration nexus (2007), that the trend of 
externalizing the security threat to the EU was already there prior to the attacks and 
rather the events of 9/11 and terrorist attacks on European soil merely reinforced an 
existing phenomenon. In other words, 9/11 did not initiate the trend of securitizing 
immigration; it was already rooted in the European security framework. Boswell, a 
prominent scholar in the field migration, also explicitly states similar views in her 
publication Migration Control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the Absence of 
Securitization (2006). She states that the terror attacks of Madrid and London did not 
have a similar effect in Europe as 9/11 did in the US (Boswell 2006:19). According to 
her research, the securitization of immigration only gained momentum initially in 
speech acts in the political sphere but proved difficult to sustain on a policy level 
(Boswell 2006:19). The reasoning of this is said to stem from cognitive constraints as 
well as diverging political interests (Boswell 2006:19).  
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Other scholars however argue that 9/11 has provided a pretext for the execution 
of policies, which would have been deemed politically unfavorable pre 9/11 (Coleman 
2007:51-52, Levy 2005:53). As Coleman (2007:51-52) explains this seemingly 
European phenomenon: “[e]ven before 9/11, policymakers throughout much of the E.U. 
viewed security through the lens of immigration, whereas policymakers in the U.S. 
tended not to until after the tragedy”. Levy (2005:54) makes a similar argument by 
illustrating that securitization was already firmly rooted in the 1970s concern over 
developments in the Middle East and Palestine and the growth of international left-wing 
and right-wing terrorism in Europe. The likes of middle-level officials and civil servants 
from ministries utilized supranational venues in order to avoid national opposition for 
their agenda (Levy 2005:54). For Levy, the security framework was reinforced in 
Europe with TREVI, which provided the structure for the illiberal practices rising in the 
political agenda of the 1980s. This security debate paved the way for restrictive 
practices differentiating between the Schengen citizen and the TCN (Levy 2005:54).  
Karyotis (2007:6) also points out to two old trends of securitization in EU 
immigration and asylum policy, instrumental and institutional merging. Karyotis claims 
that at the EU level there has been institutional merging of intergovernmental bodies, 
which deal with immigration and terrorism, and instrumental merging of anti-terrorism 
and immigration tools, illustrating the blurring of the distinction between the two issues 
(Karyotis 2007:6). Den Boer (2003:11) supports this view by pointing out that it is 
evident in EU policy, that there has been “spillover from counter-terrorism legislation to 
legislation in the immigration and asylum area”. This is especially visible in matters of 
border control, mainly visa and identity issues, allowing the securitization phenomenon 
gain momentum. 
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Looking more specifically at how the literature supports the view that 
securitization has been evident in Europe before 9/11, issues such as strict border 
control and the externalization of immigration control are highlighted. Guild (2003:9) 
emphasizes that the main aspect in EU approach to immigration, which resembles 
securitization, is the portrayal of Schengen borders drawing a geographical line around 
terrorism, a physical border keeping the enemy on the outside. Hence for many, the 
border controls themselves highlight the securitized nature. For Gammeltoft-Hansen 
(2010:2-6) the most visible evidence of externalization is the interception of migrants 
by specialized forces before they reach Europe, done through Friendship Treaties with 
sending and receiving countries. Several other scholars offer similar analyses by 
pointing to the bilateral cooperation across the Mediterranean, for instance joint naval 
patrols between Spain and Morocco, Italy and Tunisia as well as Libya (Lavenax 
2006:340). For Levy (2005:55), this tradition of externalization dates back to the 
Bosnian war with the prevention of refugees entering Europe through the creation of 
‘safe third countries’ stipulated in the Schengen Implementation Agreement of 1990 
and the Dublin Convention.  
In terms of organizational interest and actors involved in securitization, it is 
evident that securitization has a wide impact on the Union level through national 
politics. Schain builds up on the research on the topic of “venue shopping” in his article 
The State Strikes Back: Immigration Policy in the European Union (2009) whereby 
state level actors, such as key ministries, utilize EU level actors to push forward 
national goals. Union level organizations allow for more freedom of action than what 
would have been possible on national level, avoiding national parliamentary scrutiny 
and judicial enquiry (Schain 2009:102). Schain cites the work of Guiraudon (2001), 
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which illustrates such in action during the Schengen accord in the late 1980s. National 
justice and ministry civil servants dominated the process by highlighting the importance 
of utilizing immigration control in fighting transnational crime (Schain 2009:103). 
Lavenex supports this view by pointing to an analysis on European cooperation in the 
field of immigration and asylum (2006:332). According to Lavenex, needs to 
circumvent obstacles to policy reform on national level were the primary driver of JHA 
officials toward transnational cooperation concerning immigration policy (Lavenex 
2006:332). Hence restrictive policies at the EU level are a direct reflection of national 
ministries who have the ability to dominate institutional space (Schain 2009:102). 
An alternative explanation is given by the colonizing thesis. Some literature 
argues that security agencies have interests in expanding their sphere of influence to 
other regions through transferring their technologies and processes to policy areas 
outside of security (Bigo 2002:69). In the field of migration, this is evident for instance 
in the exporting of surveillance equipment and other sophisticated technology for the 
policing of borders. According to Bigo (2002:71) this also illustrates the fact that the 
inclusion of security professionals, such as the police, has been essential for the 
securitization of immigration. 
 
2.5 - Conclusion: The threat at the borders 
	  
The literature review and the theoretical context have revealed some central 
issues for the contextualization of the chapters to follow. It has illustrated the theoretical 
underpinnings of the widened concept of security. The chapter showed how 
securitization takes form first by speech and over time becomes part of institutionalized 
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practices. In terms of securitization in the context of immigration policy, the prevailing 
literature has shown two broad arguments concerning the securitization of EU 
immigration policy. The first one claims that the fight against terror has led to policy 
responses linking TCNs are potential security threats. The alternative approach attested 
that such externalization of threat was present in the security framework of the Union 
long before 9/11 and attacks in Madrid and London. Rather, new forms of security 
threats have enabled policymakers to adopt a wider range of policy options and 
mobilized the public support which has been previously unattainable. The next chapter 
will analyze these developments in the context of selected EU immigration and asylum 
legislation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EU IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM – POLICY ANALYSIS 
	  
3.1 - Introduction 
	  
This chapter deals with the policy practice of securitization. It tackles the 
institutionalization of the securitization logic in the context of EU immigration and 
asylum policy. It will cover an extensive policy analysis of the binding legal 
instruments, Directives, Regulations and Decisions, adopted by the EU. The period 
examined (2001-2011) has been a decade of extensive initiation of new legislation as 
well as harmonization and development of existing policies. Due to its institutional 
setup, the legislative bodies are subject to scrutiny from various levels and are 
extremely receptive to policy re-evaluation. This translates to multiple amendments 
within the same legislation and proposals for supplementary action. This chapter will 
consider newly established legislation within the time-period as well as draft initiatives 
and recasts in order to analyze the general trend within EU level migration policy.  
Albeit interlinked and overlapping in various ways, the chapter will divide the 
analysis into the following three categories: (1) asylum, (2) illegal entry and border 
reinforcement and (3) technology and data solutions. The analysis will focus on 
examining the nature of the policy development and indications of securitization 
through references to national / internal security as well as any overlap of policy arenas 
between migration and law enforcement. 
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3.2 - Asylum policy 
	  
According to Eurostat, in 2009 the EU-27 member states received a total of 
260,730 asylum applications (Eurostat 2010:2). For the European Union, asylum is a 
fundamental human right, granted to those who are in need of international protection, 
fleeing persecution or serious harm (European Commission 2011a). Internationally, the 
protection of rights of refugees and asylum seekers is based on the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees or as commonly known, the Geneva Convention 
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 1951). The 
protection of the asylum seeker against unlawful return is outlined in Article 33(1) 
prohibiting “refoulement” of persons who as a result of expulsion would face a threat on 
their life or freedom (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 1951:9). However paragraph 2 also clearly states that the provision does not 
apply when the person seeking international protection is suspected based on reasonable 
grounds to constitute “...a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country” (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 1951:9). Complementary to this on the EU level is 
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) prohibiting the 
expulsion of individuals, which could face as a result of extradition torture or inhuman 
punishment (European Court of Human Rights 2010:4).  However, with regard to 
exceptions based on national security, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
has set of a precedent of interpreting the non-refoulement principle in an absolute 
manner irrespective of the threat on national security of the state, highlighting that 
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Article 3 leaves no provision for exceptions (Vedsted-Hansen 2011:47). Nevertheless 
the issue remains to be debated on the political and diplomatic fields.  
The field of asylum has undergone extensive policy development since 2001. 
Due to limitations on the scope of the thesis, two comprehensive categories of asylum 
policy are considered to be of relevance to the research: Directives concerned with the 
qualification to refugee status and the examination of asylum applications. In terms of 
qualification of refugee status within the EU, Council Directive 2004/83/EC on 
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
and the content of the protection granted’ of 29 April 2004 (Official Journal of the 
European Union 2004b) is of central relevance. This Directive relates to the 
qualification for refugee status for applications received at EU borders or on EU 
territory. Adding to the Tampere Conclusions, it outlines a broad range of common 
criteria for member states on key issues of asylum applications concerning inclusion, 
exclusion and minimum rights each applicant should be provided on EU territory 
(Official Journal of the European Union 2004b).  
The first indication of restrictive measures in the field of asylum and references 
to issues of internal security are visible in the definition of those who do not enjoy 
rights on EU territory. Immediately at the beginning of the Directive the terrorist threat 
amongst asylum seekers is highlighted by defining what constitutes a threat to national 
security: “The notion of national security and public order also covers cases in which a 
third country national belongs to an association which supports international terrorism 
or supports such an association” (Official Journal of the European Union 2004b:13). 
The issue of security emerges clearly in Article 14 under ‘Revocation, ending of or 
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refusal to renew refugee status’ (Official Journal of the European Union 2004b:18). 
Essentially it gives member states the right for exclusion from the principle of non-
refoulement if the person is considered to be a danger to the security of the state 
(Official Journal of the European Union 2004b:18). Entry can be refused or revoked if: 
“(a) there are reasonable grounds for regarding him or her as a danger to the security of 
the Member State in which he or she is present; (b) he or she, having been convicted by 
a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community 
of that Member State” (Official Journal of the European Union 2004b:18). However, 
the Article does also reaffirm the member states’ responsibilities under the Geneva 
Convention. However, as it can be seen, the conditions for refoulement are left to a 
wide degree of interpretation. In total, the Directive makes eight distinct references 
allowing for exceptions from policy on the basis of national security and public order. 
However, this aspect has not gone unnoticed and has been subject to much 
criticism. In 2009, three years after the deadline to entry into force, the Commission 
issued a proposal for amending the 2004 directive on the claims that “they are 
insufficient to secure full compatibility with the evolving human rights and refugee law 
standards, they have not achieved a sufficient level of harmonisation and they impact 
negatively on the quality and efficiency of decision-making” (Commission of the 
European Communities 2009:3). However, none of these addressed the multiple 
references to national security. Similar notions are visible in the June 2010 report by the 
Commission, which highlights with regard to Article 14, that the wide interpretation has 
led to some member states implementing broad or additional grounds for exclusion and 
cessation of refugee status with insufficient regard to the Geneva Convention (European 
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Commission 2010:9-10). Despite of the general concerns over the human rights 
standards, Article 14 of Clause IV remains unchanged.  
In 2005, the Council issued a Directive further clarifying the minimum standards 
member states should adhere to when issuing and withdrawing refugee status titled 
2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (Official Journal of the European 
Union 2005). This Directive, again building on Tampere conclusions, highlights a wide 
range of rights to be ensured to asylum applicants ranging from procedural formalities, 
to representative rights and judicial review. However, when examining the Directive it 
is also apparent that it leaves a great deal to ambiguity and hence to interpretation of the 
member state. Firstly, this Directive reveals worrying developments under the pretext of 
national security, most visibly by the increased freedom for the actions of officials 
involved directly or indirectly with asylum applications. Under Article 4 (1) 
‘Responsible Authorities’ it is stipulated that member states must designate an 
authority, which is responsible for the correct examination of the applications (Official 
Journal of the European Union 2005:17). However, member states are given the option 
to allow other administrative bodies to undertake decisions over important application 
procedures such as transfer of persons and rejection of cases in instances concerning 
national security provisions (Official Journal of the European Union2005:17). Although 
Article 4 (3) vaguely stipulates that the relevant authority should have “...the 
appropriate knowledge or receive the necessary training to fulfill their obligations when 
implementing this Directive” (Official Journal of the European Union 2005:17), this 
entails the risk of persons not being granted a fair assessment of their case in the hands 
of inexperienced personnel of the member state in question. ‘Appropriate knowledge’ is 
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clearly a subjective concept, which can entail different levels of training and regard in 
different member states. 
 Furthermore, national security concerns present another exception within the 
same Directive under Article 16 (1) concerning the ‘Scope of legal assistance and 
representation’ (Official Journal of the European Union 2005:21). Member states are 
entitled to withhold information from representatives of applicants in a broad set of 
circumstances defined in the Directive as which: 
“jeopardise national security, the security of the organisations or person(s) 
providing the information or the security of the person(s) to whom the 
information relates or where the investigative interests relating to the 
examination of applications of asylum by the competent authorities of the 
Member States or the international relations of the Member States would be 
compromised” (Official Journal of the European Union 2005:21).  
 
Extending the range of circumstances to the degree of the international relations of 
member states can lead to arbitrary application of the Article and hence clearly puts the 
applicant and his/her representative in an imbalanced setting in processing the 
application. This clearly illustrates the characteristic of securitization, which under the 
pretext of national security allows for excessive measures, which in any other context 
would be deemed undemocratic. 
However, based on a report produced by the Commission, proposals for the 
amendment of the Directive have been discussed in light of criticism concerning the 
ambiguity of certain Article provisions. In 2009 the Council produced a proposal for 
amendment by the Commission to modify certain Directive provisions (Commission of 
the European Communities 2009). Various clauses of the Directive have since been 
suggested to be modified, particularly Article 4 on ‘Responsible Authorities’ 
(Commission of the European Communities 2009:24). The authorities are outlined a 
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detailed training, specifying international human rights provisions concerning non-
refoulement and non-discrimination (Commission of the European Communities 
2009:24). Most strikingly, the national security clause has been suggested to be 
removed from the Article. Although the national security reference remains under 
‘Scope of legal assistance and representation’, an additional clause has been added for 
ensuring applicant rights by guaranteeing that access is given to “the information or 
sources in question at least to a legal advisor or counsellor who has undergone a 
security check, insofar as the information is relevant to the examination of the 
application or taking a decision to withdraw international protection” (Commission of 
the European Union 2009:41).  
However the amendment proposal adopted by the Commission has not been 
accepted and further changes are currently being discussed. The renewed 2011 proposal 
goes further in presenting better addressing of potential abuse (European Commission 
2011b). However the long requirements of trainings outlined in Article 4 of the 2009 
recast have been removed again, lessening the requirements on the member states 
(European Commission 2011b:26). Furthermore, all references to exceptions based on 
national security remain in the proposed amendment (European Commission 2011b). 
Hence it is evident that despite pressure on strengthening rights of asylum seekers there 
is a desire to retain leverage of action by the member states and not be excessively 
constrained by rigid human rights considerations.  
Staying within the field of asylum, a complementary Directive, 2003/9/EC of 27 
January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, was 
issued in 2003 by the Council aimed at harmonizing reception conditions in member 
states to prevent secondary movement within the EU (Official Journal of the European 
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Union 2003). Overall the Directive is clearly aimed at improving the quality of 
conditions and rights of asylum seekers once an asylum claim is made. Only one 
reference to public or national security is made in reference to confinement of 
applicants. If deemed necessary by the member state, Article 7 allows for legal and / or 
security reasons to confine the applicant in accordance to national law (Official Journal 
of the European Union 2003:20). Again, research showed that a draft proposal for the 
Directives’ amendment has been issued in 2008 (Commission of the European 
Communities 2008c). However, when analyzing the details of the draft amendment the 
changes appear to be more towards improving the protection of asylum seekers and 
further guaranteeing of certain reception conditions in member states. Human rights 
concerns are clearly being taken account of as amendments proposed increase in the 
scope of opportunities for protection and justice, especially concerning detention 
periods (Commission of the European Communities 2008c:21). Detention is proposed 
to be allowed only in exceptional circumstances and even then the applicant is offered 
judicial remedy before a national court (Commission of the European Communities 
2008c:12). In terms of references to national or internal security, Article 8 on detention 
outlines that detaining is allowed when ‘protecting of national security and public order 
so requires’ (Commission of the European Communities 2008c:20). This is the only 
explicit reference to issues of national security. Hence to claim that human rights 
concerns are fully disregarded under the pretext of security considerations is somewhat 
excessive. 
Interestingly however, with the draft amendments on asylum Directives, all 
references to the terms “refugee” and “asylum seeker” have been removed and have 
been replaced with “applicants” or “beneficiaries of international protection”. 
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Consequently, references in the same context to the Geneva Convention are removed. 
This could indicate a move towards the Union distancing itself from international norms 
of protection in order to maintain the primacy of its own regional framework. 
Within the field of asylum, for such tug of war to take place through various 
draft amendments, there has obviously been dialogue and consideration for different 
subject areas the Directives touch upon. It clearly illustrates that policy making on the 
Union level is responsive to criticism from various levels and is not formulated in 
isolation. The characteristics of securitization are arguably more visible in the first 
drafts of the Directives in the first half of the decade. This prompts to consider the 
possibility that changes in asylum policy in response to 9/11 could have an element of a 
being reflexing policies or a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction and in the long term have potential to 
be moderated in consideration to strong international human rights obligations, as 
witnessed in the proposed recasts of the Directives towards the end of the decade. 
The literature review in the previous chapter has highlighted that the aftermath 
of 9/11 was most visibly seen in asylum policy (Spencer 2007:36, Guild 2003, Geddes 
2003:153). However, when looking at the overall development of asylum policy, dating 
back to pre 2001, an alternative explanation can also be found in terms of 
harmonization goals of the EU. In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam called for the 
establishment of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The first phase of it, 
taking place between 1999 and 2005 was aimed at the harmonization of the legal 
framework, governing asylum in the EU (European Commission Home Affairs 2011). 
As the objectives were not satisfactorily met, the harmonization and amendment of 
asylum policies continued past 2005. Hence an intensified drive towards harmonization 
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at a regional level could explain both the content and sheer quantity of the changes 
visible within the field of asylum. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that despite increase in measures in asylum 
policy, which can be seen to limit the rights of asylum seekers, other measures have 
also developed in tandem which aim to safeguard human rights of third-country 
nationals. For instance, the Council of Europe issued ‘Guidelines on Human Rights and 
the Fight against Terrorism’ on 11 July 2002, which addresses the issue of asylum and 
refoulement under section 12 (Council of Europe 2002:33-34). Hence changes in EU 
legislation concerning asylum should not be overestimated. Coleman (2007) references 
the work of Brouwer, Catz and Guild (2003) who have established that key areas which 
uphold asylum standards and rights have not been modified in the face of terrorism 
threat in Europe (Coleman 2007:59). However, it can be seen that overall legislative 
changes in the post 9/11 environment have lead to refugee status, at the very least, being 
harder to achieve and maintain.  
 
3.3 - Illegal entry and border reinforcement 
	  
Understandably, the relaxing of internal borders has security implications at the 
external borders of the EU. This section will aim to analyze the extent and 
proportionality of the security reinforcements, which aim to keep TCNs outside EU 
territory. Since 2001, there has been a clear trend of enforcing the legal framework, 
which defines sanctions concerning entry and facilitation of entry into the EU. For 
instance, COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISION of 28 November 2002 on the 
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, 
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transit and residence (2002/946/JHA) outlines explicitly sanctions, penalties and 
extradition procedures for illegal entries to the Union (Official Journal of the European 
Communities 2002a). This is further strengthened by COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit 
and residence, which leaves no room for interpretation with meanings behind 
facilitation of entry (Official Journal of the European Communities 2002b). In general 
the Directives present a tradeoff between the perceived protection of internal security 
and opportunities for international protection and human rights. 
In 2008 a Directive was issued by the Council focusing solely on measures for 
returning illegally staying TCNs with ‘DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 16 December 2008 on common standards 
and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals’ (Official Journal of the European Union 2008c). As the name suggests, the 
Directive focuses exclusively on harmonizing the measures to be undertaken by all EU 
member states concerning persons who are illegally residing in any EU member state. 
This Directive outlines the removal and return procedures, including measures such as 
detention and entry bans. This in itself implies a very securitized nature of the way the 
Union deals with its immigration and asylum policy, as to form a coordinated approach 
for the removal of TCNs. Again, what is visible when examining the Directive is the 
exclusion from the same rights or treatment of people which are thought to constitute a 
danger to public and national security. This is evident in Article 2, which defines the 
scope of the Directive. Article 2, paragraph 2(a) allows for member states not to apply 
the Directive to TCNs who: “are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 
13 of the Schengen Borders Code, or who are apprehended or intercepted by the 
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competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the 
external border of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an 
authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State” (Official Journal of the European 
Union 2008c:101). Hence in the broadest sense, member states can decide not to apply 
the rights outlined in this Directive to any person detained near the borders. 
Chapter II of the Directive outlines specific rules concerning the termination of 
illegal stay. Here it is visible that constituting a threat to public or national security 
limits the rights stipulated within the Directive. For instance, the time period allowed 
for voluntary departure (up to 30 days) is removed under Article 7 as follows “...or if 
the person concerned poses a risk to public policy, public security or national security, 
Member States may refrain from granting a period of voluntary departure, or may grant 
a period shorter than seven days” (Official Journal of the European Union 2008c:103). 
Article 11 concerning entry bans is another clear indication of the securitization trend. 
Bans are overtly enforced to accompany both return decisions without an option of 
voluntary departure and instances of non-compliance to return decision (Official Journal 
of the European Union 2008c:103). Entry bans are to be determined by the member 
state on a case-by-case basis but in principle are recommended to be five years in 
length. In cases of national security and public order bans are proposed to be longer 
than five years (Official Journal of the European Union 2008c:103). Some obvious 
human rights concerns can be raised as only victims of human trafficking who 
cooperate with authorities and do not constitute a danger to public or national security 
can be pardoned from the ban (Official Journal of the European Union 2008c:104). 
Furthermore, an obvious inconsistency is in the fact that whether the person decides to 
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leave voluntarily or involuntarily does not make a difference to the enforcement of the 
ban. 
To ensure the enforcement of such legislations, the EU has already developed a 
practice of its own, the supranational security force Europol. Although not solely a 
border control agency, Europol’s policies overlap with the field of immigration in that it 
is central in combatting illegal smuggling of immigrants (Official Journal of the 
European Union 2009:65). The establishment of Europol obviously dates pre-2001, to 
1992, however a noteworthy fact concerning its evolution is its restructuring initiated in 
January 2010. Europol became an actual entity of the European Union and gained 
independent funding from the Union’s general budget as stipulated in Council Decision 
2009/371/JHA (Official Journal of the European Union 2009:37). This restructuring or 
‘re-establishment’ as presented in the Decision, widens the scope of possibilities of 
assisting and supporting member state law enforcement officials. Although issuing a 
new Decision for the establishment of Europol to a large extent appears to be an 
administrative necessity, it also indicates the centrality and increased importance of the 
entity within EU’s security objectives today. 
More importantly, the Union has also developed a specialized security agency 
for the management of external borders. Council Regulation No. 2007/2004 in October 
2004 outlined the establishment of an European Agency for the management of 
operational cooperation at the external borders of the member states, making Frontex 
operational 1 May 2005 (Official Journal of the European Union 2004c:11). The agency 
was established in order to improve integrated border management, especially in view 
of being able to organize joint return operations for the purpose of removing TCNs from 
member state territory (Official Journal of the European Union 2004c:2). By 
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establishing an agency solely dedicated for a coordinated EU wide method for the 
removal and deterrence of TCNs, the trend of reinforcing external borders is clearly 
taking great lengths. As the agency has full legal, administrative and financial autonomy 
its influence on immigration policy is evident (Official Journal of the European Union 
2004c:2). Moreover, the emphasis placed on the agency’s importance is visible in the 
timeframe recommended for its formation. The Regulation calling for its establishment 
was issued in October 2004. Whereas it called for the agency to be active from 1 May 
2005 (Official Journal of the European Union 2004c:11). Making a border agency 
operational in less than eight months illustrates the significance placed on it by the 
Union.  
With reference to the content of the Regulation establishing Frontex, the scope 
and the mandate of the agency is revealing. It highlights under Article 2 the tasks of the 
agency to expand beyond the member states to third-countries surrounding EU external 
borders (Official Journal of the European Union 2004c:4). Such cooperation, although 
in some instances beneficial for both sides, has the potential by effectively moving the 
borders even further and enforcing them on both sides, to act as a substitute to 
protection needed by numerous TCNs. Hence, it is essential that the nature of the 
cooperation with third-countries is complementary to other legal entry methods 
available to TCNs. Article 14 follows a similar policy by mandating the “facilitation of 
operational cooperation with third countries and cooperation with competent authorities 
of third countries” (Official Journal of the European Union 2004c:5). The nature of this 
cooperation is not further elaborated on and is left open to the agency’s discretion. 
Clearly, extra-territorial patrolling and policing of borders has the potential to lead to 
fewer opportunities for asylum claims. Stopping migrants at sea before reaching EU 
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territory removes their chances of claiming asylum within the EU, not to mention the 
increased danger for the asylum seeker attempting to cross marine borders. Further 
controversial aspects are visible in Article 9 which deals with return operations which 
Frontex can organize utilizing the funds of the Union (Official Journal of the European 
Union 2004c:5). It is left solely to the agency to identify best practices on the removal 
of illegal TCNs (Official Journal of the European Union 2004c:5). Clearly the agency 
enjoys rather wide-ranging rights in terms of dealing with immigrants at the borders of 
the EU. 
The operation of Frontex has been further strengthened with the establishment 
of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) with Regulation No 863/2007 in July 
2007 (Official Journal of the European Union 2007). RABIT is aimed at the 
management of external borders to combat mainly illegal immigration and preventing 
threats to internal security (Official Journal of the European Union 2007:30). Its 
purpose is for a limited period in exceptional cases, for instance, in events of mass 
influx of TCNs. Strikingly, RABIT is allowed to use extensive force. It includes service 
weapons, ammunition and equipment in self-defense and in defense of team members 
and other people (Official Journal of the European Union 2007:33). Unmistakably the 
creation of such an armed force illustrates the emphasis placed on securing the external 
borders. The Regulation does also however highlight in Article 2 that the creation of 
RABIT does not impact the rights of refugees or persons seeking international 
protection (Official Journal of the European Union 2007:32). Hence the securitization 
aspect on the expense of human rights should not be exaggerated. Furthermore, Article 
6 pertaining to the powers of the team members reiterates the importance of human 
rights considerations with respect to the conduct of the RABIT team (Official Journal of 
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the European Union 2007:33). Furthermore, it is important to note that the team does 
not have rights to refuse incoming people entry unless directed by the border guards of 
the member state in question (Official Journal of the European Union 2007:34). All 
these measure do however illustrate one of the central features of securitization 
highlighted in the literature, the blurring between law enforcement and migration 
practices. 
 
3.4 - Technology and data solutions 
	  
Another aspect that plays an important role in immigration policy is 
technological developments in information sharing and document sophistication. This 
affects all policy aspects of legal and illegal entry and most importantly, asylum policy. 
Whilst acknowledging that extensive development has occurred in technological 
sophistication related to immigration control, this section will limit its analysis to the 
central tools, which support identification of individuals at border crossings. 
The development of Schengen Information System (SIS) has paved the way for 
information sharing for immigration and security purposes in the EU, dating back to the 
1990s (Official Journal of the European Communities 2001:4). It has developed in 
tandem with the expansion of the EU and is a vital component for allowing free 
movement of people within the Schengen area. The development of the second 
generation SIS II has been a necessity from the expansion of the EU due to limitations 
on capacity (Official Journal of the European Communities 2001:4). Mainly it is used 
for public and national security within the Schengen area through a centralized 
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information system with national interfaces to issue alerts for instance concerning 
people wanted for extradition (Official Journal of the European Communities 2001). 
At the center of EU issued visas for TCNs is the Visa Information System (VIS) 
established with Council Decision of 8 June 2004, 2004/512/EC (Official Journal of the 
European Union 2004d). The importance of such a comprehensive system, which 
allows member states to monitor and exchange data, was emphasized early on in 2002 
by the European Commission (Official Journal of the European Union 2004d:5). The 
development of a central VIS linked with national interfaces enables entering, viewing 
and sharing of electronic visa data by member state officials (Official Journal of the 
European Union 2004d:6). This Decision, in Article 4, also introduced the development 
of new security requirements such as biometric information: fingerprints and facial 
recognition (Official Journal of the European Union 2004d:6). Evidently, this has 
contributed to identity and entry documents issued by the EU being of a higher level of 
sophistication over many national documents of third-countries.  
REGULATION (EC) No 767/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and 
the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation) 
further clarified the purpose and scope of the system (Official Journal of the European 
Union 2008b). Its purpose in facilitating Union immigration and asylum policy is 
manifold. Not only does it assist in the implementation of a common visa policy but 
also holds a pivotal role in preventing visa shopping between member states, 
combatting fraud and facilitates external border checks (Official Journal of the 
European Union 2008b:60). The VIS stores extensive application history, allowing for 
tracking of previous applications, ongoing applications and rejected applications 
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(Official Journal of the European Union 2008b:65). If a visa application is refused on 
the grounds of the person constituting a threat to public policy or internal security it is 
added to the visa application file on the VIS (Official Journal of the European Union 
2008b:67). 
The securitized character of the use of VIS becomes obvious in Article 3 by the 
use of data for “the prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and 
other serious criminal offences” (Official Journal of the European Union 2008b:63). 
This Article allows for member state authorities to access the data if they believe that it 
will contribute substantially to the prevention of terrorist or other serious crimes. 
Moreover, Europol is also granted access to the data in instances vaguely described as 
“necessary for the performance of its tasks” (Official Journal of the European Union 
2008b:63). Moreover, even though Article 3, Paragraph 4 states that VIS data cannot be 
transferred to third-countries or international organizations it allows for sharing of the 
data in exceptional cases of urgency if it will contribute to the prevention of serious 
criminal offences (Official Journal of the European Union 2008a:63-64). Hence the 
VIS, a database for visa applications, is used explicitly for law enforcement purposes 
and allows for, under the pretext of national security, transfer of information on TCNs 
to other member states, third countries, international organizations and the European 
police force.  
The rationale of giving Europol access to VIS is separately outlined in 
COUNCIL DECISION 2008/633/JHA of 23 June 2008 concerning access for 
consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by designated authorities of Member 
States and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and investigation of 
terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences (Official Journal of the 
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European Union 2008a). The Council believes that VIS data is essential in Europol’s 
tasks in combatting terrorism and guaranteeing the internal security of the EU (Official 
Journal of the European Union 2008a:129). On the grounds of urgency, Europol is also 
granted relatively unrestricted grounds for action. Article 4 allows for requests for data 
to be initiated, either electronically or orally, prior to providing any verification and the 
justification required by the Council Decision for the request can be provided ex-post 
facto  (Official Journal of the European Union 2008a:132). 
 Concerning the actual implementation of the VIS requirements, a Decision was 
issued in 2009 outlining the regions where VIS should be implemented first based on 
the risk the regions pose to the EU. COMMISSION DECISION of 30 November 2009 
determining the first regions for the start of operations of the Visa Information System 
(VIS) singles out countries which present the most threat to the member states’ internal 
security or pose the greatest risk of illegal immigration (Official Journal of the 
European Union 2010:62). Such risk estimation is based on statistics on visa and entry 
refusals (Official Journal of the European Union 2010:62). North Africa is outlined as 
the most urgent region, the Near East second and the Gulf Region the third (Official 
Journal of the European Union 2010:62). Drawing such a simple correlation between 
visa refusals and threats to internal security is highly questionable. This also illustrates 
how the issues of immigration and security are tied together and presented as two 
issues, which cannot be dealt with separately from each other. 
The monitoring of TCNs has support on the Union level to be developed even 
further. There are ongoing discussions that TCNs who are not subject to visas would be 
subject to additional border checks of some kind (Commission of the European 
Communities 2008b:5). Currently, TCNs either require a visa or not, which has raised 
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security concerns over TCNs which enjoy extra liberties over other TCNs. It has been 
suggested that TCNs not subject to visa requirements should have to use an Electronic 
System of Travel Authorisation (ESTA), which in practice means a form of pre-
registration of travel or alternatively a system of registration of entry and exit into the 
EU (Commission of the European Communities 2008b:5).  
Obligation to transmit data on TCNs entering the EU has also been widened to 
apply to aviation officers. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the 
obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data (also known as the API, Advance 
Passenger Information, Directive) has been adopted for the improvement of border 
controls through the advance transfer of passenger data from airline carriers to national 
officers (Official Journal of the European Union 2004a:25). The information that is 
required to be provided is only readable data from the passport, hence name, date and 
place of birth, passport number and expiry date. Failure by the carrier to do so is a 
punishable offence under Article 4 (Official Journal of the European Union 2004a:26).  
There is indication of information collection and transfer being taken even 
further. The European Commission has put forward a proposal in February 2011 for a 
Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for the prevention, 
detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime 
(European Commission 2011c). Already initiated in 2007, PNR data is essentially a law 
enforcement tool rather than a border control method but nevertheless it has 
implications on the field of immigration also. If implemented, it would oblige additional 
information concerning TCN passengers to be transmitted prior to commencement of 
the travel. This information would include data initially given for reservation and 
departure purposes, such as travel agent used, payment method for travel or baggage 
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information  (European Commission 2011c:3). It is hoped to contribute in identifying 
security threats by using advance commercial data prior to the travel actually taking 
place. It differs largely from the VIS, SIS and API as those can be used only when the 
identity of a suspect is known (European Commission 2011c:3). PNR data however 
would profile the potential threats to the member states by flagging suspicious 
information. Hence, if adopted it makes persons entering the EU vulnerable to arbitrary 
investigation and raises questions on data protection. It also clearly illustrates the 
general trend on where information transfer on travellers crossing EU borders is 
heading and yet again illustrates the excessive measures adopted under the pretext of 
security. 
Taking the surveillance aspect even further, another tool still in the planning 
phases is EUROSUR, an external border surveillance system put forward in 2008 by the 
Commission (Commission of the European Communities 2008a). It is a direct security 
tool aimed at securing the Southern and Eastern maritime borders of the Union (the 
Mediterranean Sea, the Southern Atlantic Ocean and the Black Sea) especially against 
illegal immigration (Commission of the European Communities 2008a). It is solely 
aimed at ensuring internal security of the EU through the development of a shared 
surveillance system and shared monitoring and controlling of borders (Commission of 
the European Communities 2008a). It proposed the introduction of use of satellites for 
border monitoring through GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security) 
and cooperation with Frontex (Commission of the European Communities 2008a:9).  
The purpose of EUROSUR is to increase member states’ awareness of their border 
situation and also their reaction capabilities (Commission of the European Communities 
2008a:4). The proposal for EUROSUR makes a direct link between migration and 
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security by stating that “[d]ue to the complexity of developing such a "system of 
systems", and taking into account the current migratory pressure, in a first step the 
integrated network should be limited to the areas mentioned above and focus on internal 
security, linking border control authorities, and other European and national authorities 
with security interests and responsibilities in the maritime domain together” 
(Commission of the European Communities 2008a:9).  
However to claim that such securitization through reinforcement of data transfer 
obligations is completely new is erroneous. Evidence of such monitoring and forming 
of databases also pre-dates 9/11 and is not necessarily an indication of a new trend in 
migration policy. Specifically concerning asylum applicants, the Union has recognized 
the need to register and monitor TCNs entering the Union. The creation of EURODAC 
paved the way in this, mandated in the Dublin Convention to function as a large 
fingerprint database of all asylum applicants as well as illegal migrants apprehended 
within the EU  (Official Journal of the European Communities 2000:1).  
 
3.5 - Conclusion: Fortress Europe 
 
This chapter sought to examine the trends in immigration and asylum policy by 
looking at the character of EU secondary legislation since 2001. It is evident that a wide 
degree of policy harmonization is required within an expanding Union to preserve a 
borderless EU. However, the scale of the transformation is revealing. Overall, when 
looking at the features of securitization outlined in chapter two, the policy analysis has 
revealed that such characteristics are present in the legislation adopted. Linking 
migration to issues of law enforcement and adopting exceptional and anti-democratic 
measures indicates a move away from global human rights norms under the pretext of 
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safeguarding the security of the citizens of the member states. Through stricter asylum 
standards, reinforcement of external borders and more sophisticated monitoring of 
TCNs, the EU has effectively highlighted the primacy of migration policy in 
maintaining internal security. Especially within asylum policy, securitization has caused 
a tradeoff between unconditional guaranteeing on human rights for all and the 
safeguarding the lives of EU citizens only. Moreover, there is a clear inconsistency in 
the linking of asylum and national security threats. Many scholars have highlighted that 
such association between asylum seekers and terrorism does not work (Coleman 2007, 
Spencer 2007, Cesari 2006, Guild 2003). As asylum procedures are often the lengthiest 
and involve the most bureaucracy, documented cases of asylum being used for terrorist 
entry are uncommon (Coleman 2007:51). Furthermore, scholars have shown that the 
primary terrorist threat in Europe is homegrown, mainly resulting from failed immigrant 
integration (Sendagorta 2005:64). Hence there is clearly a mismatch in the social profile 
of the terrorist in Europe and its ramifications on immigration and asylum policy. 
Therefore, the next chapter will aim the shed light on the securitization phenomenon by 
examining the discourse aspect pertaining to EU migration policy.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EU IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM – DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS 
4.1 - Introduction 
	  
This chapter seeks to examine how national security rhetoric has been 
incorporated into the discourse of the EU on immigration policy. It will do so by 
looking at Meeting Conclusions published by the European Council on immigration and 
Reports issued by the European Parliament pertaining to the actions of the Council and 
the Commission. The Conclusions and Reports will be analyzed in parallel in 
chronological order covering a ten-year time starting from September 2001. 
The methodology will consist of several aspects. Firstly the general approach to 
the topic and language used is considered. Secondly, it will be analyzed whether the 
issue of immigration is debated in the security context, by looking for references to 
public order, internal security or the threat of terrorism. Looking specifically at the 
characteristics of securitization outlined by the extensive literature on the topic, the 
analysis in the chapter will look out for recommendations for adoption of extraordinary 
solutions in dealing with immigration. General trends in the discourse will be identified 
within immigration issues itself as well as looking whether references to migration are 
made in different policy arenas within the meeting conclusions issued. In terms of 
looking at the influence of incidences of terrorism in Europe on the discourse of the 
Council, the analysis will pay attention to specific time periods, namely 2004 post 
Madrid attacks and 2005 post London bombings. This will enable to understand 
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whether the heightened security situation in Europe has influenced the discourse on 
immigration.  
Overall, it will be analyzed which aspects of migration policy the Council and 
the Parliament place specific emphasis on and whether the securitized aspect of 
discourse is balanced with human rights and development considerations. As the 
Parliament is often described as the watchdog of the Commission and the Council, this 
chapter will aim to examine whether the Parliament continues to act as the “moral 
guide” of the Union, or whether the securitization logic is visible in the Parliament 
discourse as well. 
 
4.2 – 2001 - 2006: The period of terrorism 
  
Following the events of 9/11, the Council of the European Union arranged for an 
extraordinary meeting to discuss the plan of action in the face of the changed security 
environment. Although, the Council called for the urgent implementation of measures 
agreed upon at the Tampere meeting (including migration policies), no clear parallels 
were immediately drawn concerning migration objectives and the securing of Europe’s 
external borders (European Council 2001a:2).  
 By the end of 2001, following the Laeken meeting conclusions the Council 
formed its discussion around the events of 9/11 and the new challenges from 
globalization (European Council 2001b). Within this context, the Council stated that the 
public has called for a greater role of the EU in managing security through controlling 
of migration flows and cross-border crime (European Council 2001b:20). Hence, it 
legitimized its actions within the context of an increased threat to internal security. 
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Revealing of this meeting is the fact that the discussion of immigration emerges in the 
context of anti-terrorism measures, and not an agenda on its own. By highlighting the 
importance of developing efficient border control and a comprehensive visa 
identification system in the context of anti-terrorism, the Council drew a clear 
correlation between fighting illegal immigration and fighting terrorism (European 
Council 2001b:12). Furthermore, the Council stated at Leiken that management of 
migration flows is something that should be integrated into EU foreign policy 
(European Council 2001b:11). Hence by highlighting the centrality of cooperation with 
third-countries in the field of migration, the Council is implying that issues of 
immigration in the EU are not seen as the sole responsibility of the Union. 
 Following the June 2002 meeting in Seville, the Council reiterated the urgency 
of speeding up advances agreed upon at Tampere (European Council 2002:7). The 
migration issue is singled out as something to which upcoming presidencies should 
dedicate special focus and time (European Council 2002:7). The general focus of the 
Council discussion on immigration remains on combatting illegal immigration and 
enforcing barriers at the external borders. With reference to the content of immigration 
issues prioritized, the Council reaffirmed the importance of including countries of origin 
and transit in EU migration policy (European Council 2002:7). Here again, the Council 
view of externalizing its migration policy by engaging third-countries and sharing the 
responsibility is visible. This can be seen as a positive development in the sense that it 
is an acknowledgement on the part of the Council that the border control measures 
adopted by the EU are not sufficient alone to address the problem of illegal 
immigration. The Council considers that by engaging in trade and overall development 
with TCNs, migration flows will lessen, hence acknowledging the root causes of 
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migration. The primacy of migration policy in EU foreign policy is explicit in the 
Council’s statement on conditionality of relations with third-countries: “The European 
Council urges that any future cooperation, association or equivalent agreement which 
the European Union or the European Community concludes with any country should 
include a clause on joint management of migration flows and on compulsory 
readmission in the vent of illegal immigration” (European Council 2002:10). The 
Council clearly considers that the states of origin and transit should particularly bear 
responsibility in terms of readmission and border control, to which the Union is 
allocating special funds (European Council 2002:11). However, what the Council calls 
“an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackling the roots causes of 
illegal immigration” has significantly less emphasis in the Conclusion in comparison to 
the law enforcement measures outlined to combat illegal immigration. For instance, a 
common visa system is reiterated to have top priority and the development of a 
European police force (European Council 2002:9). Furthermore, it gives a clear 
prioritized schedule for actions that should take place in 2002 and 2003: joint operations 
at borders organized by end of December 2002 and by June 2003 joint border guard 
training (European Council 2002:10). Hence, although there is clearly consideration of 
both sides, it is not well balanced allowing the securitization aspect to dominate.  
Furthermore, the Council illustrates its firm stance on immigration by 
highlighting the consequences of not cooperating with the Union:  
 “The European Council considers it necessary to carry out a systematic 
 assessment of relations with third-countries which do not cooperate in 
 combatting illegal immigration. That assessment will be taken into account in 
 relations between the European Union and its Member States and the countries 
 concerned, in all relevant areas. Insufficient cooperation by a country could 
 hamper the establishment of closer relations between that country and the 
 Union” (European Council 2002:11, emphasis added). 
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The Council does also acknowledge that there should be a balance between combatting 
illegal immigration and integrating legally residing immigrants (European Council 
2002:7). In terms of legal entry, it is highlighted by the Council that the intake of 
immigrants should only occur taking into consideration the reception capacity of the 
Union and the member states (European Council 2002:8). Hence, it is apparent that the 
influence of the Union is more applicable in terms of entry restrictions than initiatives 
for legal entry. This is an area where Member States have retained their sovereignty. 
A similar trend continues in 2003 in the discourse at the Thessaloniki 
Conclusions, by the Council emphasizing that managing illegal immigration is a two-
way process involving third-countries (European Council 2003a:3). Hence combatting 
illegal immigration has been equated with the foreign policy of the EU. In terms of 
cooperating with third-countries, the Council emphasizes that each country should be 
evaluated individually. This would entail undertaking an evaluation mechanism to 
monitor countries, which fail to cooperate with the EU in illegal immigration (European 
Council 2003a:5). This clearly illustrates the weight placed on migration on the foreign 
relations of the EU and more so foreign relations on the terms of the Union. 
A new trend in the November 2003 Brussels Conclusions is evident as the 
Council makes an obvious connection between the enlargement of the European Union 
and the safety of member states’ citizens. (European Council 2003b:9). By stating that 
the Union is committed to guaranteeing the security of its citizens in the context of 
migration and expansion of borders towards the East, the Council illustrates that the 
threat is being framed as not solely originating from its Southern borders but from the 
Eastern borders also. The weight placed on border management is illustrative in the 
Council’s declaration of allocating 140 million euros for management of external 
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borders and especially for the implementation of a return policy programme and the 
VIS (European Council 2003b:9). Cooperation with third-countries is again highlighted 
as being of importance in relation to combatting illegal immigration (European Council 
2003b:10). The Council also highlights the importance of Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnerships (European Council 2003b:13). This ties in with the inclusion of migration 
policy into EU foreign policy. The conclusion calls for a report from the Council and 
the Commission on identifying priorities concerning a common return policy. The 
return policy is stated as being “a key element” of EU’s overall immigration policy 
(European Council 2003b:10). Hence the securitized element, through the use of 
exceptional measures, is evident throughout the Meeting Conclusions. However, the 
Council does also call upon the member states to cooperate with the Commission 
concerning a study investigating the links between legal and illegal immigration 
(European Council 2003b:11). Hence there are signals toward an alternative logic to 
that of securitization. 
 In March 2004, the Council convened in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, 
issuing a ‘Declaration on Combatting Terrorism’ (European Council 2004a). Looking 
for any correlations drawn between the incident and the rhetoric used by the Council 
concerning migration issues, the publication reveals that the Council called for 
simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence from any field, which could be 
relevant to combatting terrorism, as well as maximizing the effectiveness of all 
information systems utilized by the Union agencies (European Council 2004a:5,7). 
Hence in this context, migration tools of VIS, SIS II and EURODAC are singled out 
and the importance of their development and interoperability. They are of high value in 
the fight against terrorism (European Council 2004a:7). Furthermore, the Council 
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proposed taking information databases further by bringing forward a system which 
allows for the exchange of information such as DNA and fingerprints to which law 
enforcement agencies will have access to (European Council 2004a:7). Moreover the 
Council points out to the urgent use of immigration measures such as passenger data 
communication, customs cooperation and biometric visas and passports in fighting 
terrorism. Urgent implementation of Frontex, by January 2005, is also called for 
(European Council 2004a:9). The urgency placed on the agency is evident in the fact 
that according to the Regulation Frontex was intended to be operational by 1 May 2005, 
as shown in the previous chapter. Calling for a border agency to be operational in less 
than 3 months illustrates the significance the Council placed on Frontex. 
The Council also pushed for the Commission to put forward a proposal on the 
use of passenger data for law enforcement and aviation security (European Council 
2004a:8). It is clear that the securitization aspect is visible here in the heavy emphasis 
placed on restricting and monitoring entry into the EU, involving means, which 
arguably are anti-democratic but are justified in the context of security. By overtly 
outlining migration tools in the context of anti-terrorism, the issue of migration and 
internal security is tied together, exemplifying a clear securitization trend. 
The November 2004 meeting conclusions continue to emphasize the changed 
realities after 9/11 and the Madrid attacks, and the role of the Union in guaranteeing 
security (European Council 2004b:12). The centrality of security in the principles of the 
EU becomes evident in the following statement: 
  “The security of the European Union and its Member States has acquired a new 
 urgency, especially in the light of the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 
 September 2001 and in Madrid on 11 March 2004. The citizens of Europe 
 rightly expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental 
 freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border 
 problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human 
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 beings, terrorism and organized crime, as well as the prevention thereof. Notably 
 in the field of security, the coordination and coherence between the internal and 
 the external dimension has been growing in importance and needs to continue to 
 be vigorously pursued” (European Council 2004b:12). 
 
This clearly illustrates the centrality of security and further its connection to illegal 
immigration in the Council discourse, as illegal immigration is highlighted as one of the 
major problems facing Europe’s security (European Council 2004b:12). The importance 
of the external dimension of migration control through partnerships with third-countries 
is yet again reiterated. The Council is implying that asylum and migration are not solely 
the problem of the EU but an international issue, which should be dealt with 
multilaterally. Return and re-admission policy is again singled out by stating that “[t]he 
European Council calls for the establishment of an effective removal and repatriation 
policy based on common standards for persons to be returned in a humane manner and 
with full respect for their human rights and dignity” (European Council 2004b:22). 
 In terms of a balanced discussion concerning legal entry options into the EU, the 
Council states that legal migration has importance within the Union but the estimation 
of numbers is left to the competency of the member state (European Council 2004b:19). 
Hence, discussion on combatting illegal immigration is bound to dominate the Council 
agenda as issues of legal entry appear to a large extent to be something outside the 
scope of the Union affairs. 
The blurring of boundaries between law enforcement and migration is visible in 
the speech of the Council by yet again placing strong emphasis on information and data 
gathering and its use for both immigration and law enforcement. The Council calls for 
“reciprocal access to or interoperability of national databases, or direct (on-line) access, 
including for Europol, to existing central EU databases such as the SIS” (European 
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Council 2004b:28). Only in December 2004 conclusions, immigration is mentioned in 
the context of radicalization of youth (European Council 2004c:13). This appears to be 
the first indication from the Council speech that the threat to the security of the Union 
can originate from the inside too. 
In 2006 there are no significant changes in the approach of the Council to the 
issue of migration. In the June Conclusions the emphasis continues to be on focusing 
efforts with third-countries and cooperation at the Southern borders, especially the 
Mediterranean region (European Council 2006a:4). The Council illustrates efforts to 
utilize dialogue with African countries through a variety of means, regional 
organizations, African Union and pan-African conferences, in order to increase the 
accountability to African states to the problem of illegal immigration the Union faces 
(European Council 2006a:4). 
The Conclusions of the meeting held by the Council in December 2006 however 
illustrate recognition by the Council that solely coercing third-countries into agreements 
on repatriation will not bring results (European Council 2006b:8). The Council 
discussed the integration of migration issues into aid policies and recommendations on 
national development strategies. The Council declares that the new approach of the 
Union will fully incorporate the connection between migration and development in to 
Union wide policy, taking the initiative also to the international arena (European 
Council 2006b:8). This illustrates a balance to the securitized approach, which has 
appeared to dominate the discourse over other considerations. 
The centrality of Frontex in securing the EU is given again extensive emphasis. 
The Council calls for enhancing its abilities, personnel and finance (European Council 
2006b:10). Surveillance measures and formation of a permanent Coastal Patrol Network 
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for the Southern maritime borders are said to be instrumental in developing a coherent 
migration policy to deter illegal immigration (European Council 2006b:10). Moreover, 
the necessary means to make RABIT operational are requested to be rushed by the 
Council (European Council 2006b:11). Hence, instruments policing and securing the 
external borders of the EU are again given priority in the migration discussion. 
The Council engaged in some discussion on legal migration, noting that it is the 
responsibility of each member state to assess its own needs for migrant labor. Hence, 
this could rationalize the lack of development of legal migration in parallel to stricter 
immigration control on the Union level. Illegal immigration is dealt with on the Union 
level, but legal immigration is at the discretion of member states.  
Reports issued by the European Parliament for the same time period offer a stark 
contrast. In July 2002 the Parliament issued a report ‘on asylum: common procedure 
and internal security’. This report is largely a response to the Council Laeken Summit 
of December 2001, which stressed the importance of the common asylum policy and 
also a reaction to the concerns over security in Europe following 9/11 and the 
subsequent extraordinary Council meeting in September 2001 (European Parliament 
2002:10). The Report sends a clear message to the Commission and the Council in 
defense of human rights amidst increased concerns over internal security. In its 
explanatory statement the Report stresses that “[w]hilst measures to tighten security and 
protect EU citizens are welcome, the EU must ensure it avoids inadvertently curbing the 
very human rights and freedoms it seeks to protect” (European Parliament 2002:10). 
This view is strongly present throughout the Report. It takes on the task of emphasizing 
the need to guarantee rights of asylum seekers and refugees in the face of the upcoming 
harmonization process for the common asylum policy. Differing largely from the tone 
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of the Council, the Parliament asserts that the co-ordination efforts in the field of 
asylum should serve the purpose of strengthening rather than substituting existing 
legislative measures, and further should fully respect the Geneva Convention (European 
Parliament 2002:6). With reference to the content of the proposed asylum policies, the 
European Parliament touches on key issues highlighted as contentious within the 
legislative analysis. It highlights the need for adequate training of staff involved in 
asylum applications to ensure that human rights standards are being followed (European 
Parliament 2002:7). Furthermore, an issue highlighted in prior discussion, the blurring 
of law enforcement and asylum tools is a matter the Parliament raises concern over. The 
Parliament views the proposals concerning the use of biometric data such as DNA from 
asylum applications for criminal investigation purposes as worrying (European 
Parliament 2002:7). This issue is further reiterated in the context of Eurodac data, 
followed by Parliament encouragement for the development of legislation on the 
privacy of biometric data on asylum seekers (European Parliament 2002:9). This is 
clear in the following statement: “The Eurodac system was set up as a database of 
asylum seekers' fingerprints, with a view to guarding against asylum seekers making 
multiple applications across the EU. This information cannot be used for criminal 
investigation purposes under current data protection rules.” (European Parliament 
2002:14). 
 The excessive emphasis the Council has given to measures to combat illegal 
immigration as opposed to the protection of TCNs, also visible in the previous section 
of the analysis, is also addressed by the Parliament. The Parliament states that 
“arrangements for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers must be given the 
same importance as policy designed to control migratory flows and combat the 
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activities of organised criminals seeking to exploit would-be migrants and 
asylum-seekers” (European Parliament 2002:7).  
 Concerning internal security, the Parliament explicitly states the motivation for 
the report as a reminder on member state responsibilities concerning human rights and 
the Geneva Convention after the Council Conclusion on terrorism issued post 9/11. The 
appropriate concerns over anti-terrorism measures spilling over to immigration policy in 
the rhetoric of the Council are aptly crystallized in the following Parliament statement: 
 “Whilst welcoming the need to tighten EU security, it is crucial that measures 
 introduced to deal with the threat to internal security are proportionate, effective 
 and, above all, safeguard human rights. Such measures must only therefore be 
 considered as a part of the war against terrorism and not the solution, especially 
 as it seems unlikely that a terrorist would subject him or herself to the scrutiny 
 of the asylum procedure.” (European Parliament 2002:12). 
 
This is a complete contrast to the securitized rhetoric visible in the Council conclusions 
in the immediate aftermath of the events of 9/11. Measures highlighted as essential for 
the safeguarding of European security by the Council, are by the Parliament labelled as 
issues of concern and as such requiring careful adherence to human rights obligations. 
 However, the November 2003 Parliament Report offers a remarkably different 
outlook on the connection between immigration and security issues. The Report is a 
response to the Thessaloniki Council meeting and communication between the Council 
and the Commission concerning ‘development of a common policy on illegal 
immigration, smuggling and trafficking of human beings, external borders and the 
return of illegal residents’ (European Parliament 2003). The report places similar 
emphasis on the securing of external borders and combatting illegal immigration in 
defense of internal security as the Council: “The ongoing threat to the internal security 
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of the EU posed by cross-border terrorism, organised crime, illegal immigration and 
trafficking in human beings and drugs has already prompted Parliament to draw up a 
report which sets out various priorities concerning measures to improve the protection 
of external borders” (European Union 2003:12). This statement is in addition to the 
correlation the Parliament drew between the enlargement of the EU and increased 
security concerns: “[The Parliament t]akes the view that the vital need for uniform 
security standards at all the external borders of the enlarged EU calls for both 
responsibility sharing in connection with the task of securing sections of those borders 
which are particularly at risk and improvements in the effectiveness of measures by 
means of joint action or coordination” (European Union 2003:7). These statements, 
along with the emphasis based on measures of border control and return policies, mimic 
the securitized nature of the rhetoric used by the Council. 
 An interesting feature of the Report is also the emphasis placed on the 
sovereignty of member states and the autonomy they should retain over their borders. 
This is explicit in the following statements: “... it must be made clear once again that the 
protection of external borders is a fundamentally national matter and must therefore 
remain a Member State competence... [a]ccordingly, some tasks could be carried out at 
EU level with a view to supporting, complementing or coordinating the work of 
national authorities” (European Parliament 2003:12). This was somewhat a different 
emphasis from that of the Council. 
 The Parliament does however acknowledge the link between legal and illegal 
migration and the importance of increasing opportunities for legal entry. It highlights 
several areas concerning legal immigration member states should pay attention to as 
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well as a speeded response in the field of legal immigration and integration of TCNs 
(European Parliament 2003:8). 
 In September 2004 the European Parliament issued a Report titled ‘including a 
proposal for a recommendation of the European Parliament to the Council and to the 
European Council on the future of the area of freedom, security and justice as well as 
on the measures required to enhance the legitimacy and effectiveness thereof’. This 
Report dealt with a broad range of issues related to the area of freedom, security and 
justice, especially asylum. The role of the Parliament in defending asylum rights is 
again visible in the Report. The now consistent Council trend of an unbalanced 
immigration policy is regretted by the Parliament as the “progress in the field of asylum 
and immigration has been mainly devoted thus far to action to counter illegal 
immigration and has not been accompanied by sufficient efforts to promote the 
integration of legally resident aliens” (European Parliament 2004:5). It again 
emphasizes the need to develop legal routes for immigration in the hope of reducing 
illegal immigration (European Parliament 2004:9).  The Parliament is also very critical 
of the Council for failing to respect the co-decision applicable from 1 May 2004 
concerning some immigration and asylum matters (European Parliament 2004:16). The 
following statement is very illustrative of the battle over authority between the 
European Parliament and the Council:  
 “Here, the Council is not only politically and morally at fault: in legal terms, it 
 has failed to act. We are, in fact, witnessing a curious case of legislative 
 schizophrenia, as the Council is unwilling to extend the area of codecision, 
 despite the possibilities and, indeed, requirements of the Treaty of Nice, and 
 although the governments recognise the justification of such an extension in that 
 they are preparing to sign a treaty that constitutionalises it.” (European 
 Parliament 2004:16). 
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Hence, such defense of jurisdiction makes it evident that the Council and Parliament do 
not follow similar policy objectives and the Council would rather limit the Parliament’s 
influence over the direction immigration policy takes. 
 In May 2005 the Parliament issued a Report concerning the link between legal 
and illegal migration. This Report is very illustrative of the Parliament’s defense for 
rights of TCNs. In the Report, the Parliament “[s]tresses that any measures to combat 
illegal immigration and step up external border controls, even where in cooperation 
with third countries, must be compatible with the guarantees and the fundamental rights 
of the individual laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, notably the right to asylum and the 
right of non-refoulement” (European Parliament 2005:7). With reference to the 
detaining of asylum seekers, the Parliament severely criticizes the proposal that asylum 
seekers or TCNs without documentation would be detained outside the EU (European 
Parliament 2005:8).  Hence the human rights emphasis continues to be strong even in 
the long run, and despite of the opposite discourse developing amongst the Council. 
 
4.3 – 2007 - 2011: Long-term trends emerging 
	  
Looking at a time period further from the terrorist attacks the research into 
meeting conclusions from 2007 to 2011 attempts to establish any changes in the rhetoric 
of the Council and Parliament in its migration policy.   
However June 2007 meeting conclusions suggest no changes in the content or 
manner in which the Council approaches the issue. It continues to emphasize the need 
to speed up the process of developing a comprehensive migration policy and building 
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“genuine” partnerships with third-countries (European Council 2007:4). Hence close 
cooperation with third-countries remains high on the agenda of the Council. Frontex is 
again highlighted again as the key to border management and the development of 
Coastal Patrol Network and RABIT are requested to be developed with the utmost 
urgency (European Council 2007:5). Reference to the security of the people in the EU is 
again made by stating that the development of a comprehensive VIS is essential for the 
security of the Union (European Council 2007:5). Suggestions for further securitization 
by the Council are evident in calls for the extension of Europol’s operational 
capabilities and welcoming of the transformation of the mandate of Europol (European 
Council 2007:6).  
 The stance or agenda of the Council does not shift in 2008 in any form or 
manner. In June 2008, the Council continued to emphasize the importance of dialogue 
and partnerships with third-countries (European Council 2008:3). This trend has been 
evident since 2001 and appears be the longstanding perspective of the Council. 
 In June 2009 the security approach to migration is evident by its emphasis on 
combatting illegal immigration. The Council stated the European response should be 
based on firmness and to continue all of its activities in the Western Mediterranean 
region and at the eastern and southeastern borders (European Council 2009a:14). 
Furthermore it called for the rapid establishment of the European Asylum Support 
Office, which assists in the relocation of asylum seekers. Correspondingly, strengthened 
border control coordinated by Frontex was yet again stressed (European Council 
2009a:14). The securitized nature of the Council’s approach to migration is very 
expressive in the following October 2009 statement: “A determined European response 
based on firmness, solidarity and shared responsibility remains essential” (European 
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Council 2009b:11). Here the central themes are evident; a hard stance on an external 
threat and action by all states affected. The Council also discusses the launching of 
reallocation on a voluntary basis of beneficiaries of international protection present in 
Malta and urges more of the member states to participate (European Council 2009b:11). 
Clearly the Council emphasis is on repatriation and deterrence of entry. The mandate of 
Frontex is deemed worthy of being enhanced by increasing its operational capabilities 
and putting Frontex at the center of cooperation between origin and transit countries. 
The Council also wishes the Commission to explore the possibility of financing Frontex 
to organize regular joint return flights (European Council 2009b:12). For instance, 
Libya is highlighted as a country that should engage in more dialogue and cooperation 
in terms of illegal immigration and readmission agreements with the Union (European 
Council 2009b:12). 
 The Council does pay some regard to asylum rights, and in its December 
meeting highlights the importance of establishing a common system of asylum by 2012 
(European Council 2009c:11). However, in the same vein, the Council reiterates that 
combatting illegal immigration remains a priority. Overall the migration dilemma is 
framed as a dimension of EU foreign affairs in the context of new challenges from 
globalization and the unique role the Union can play through integration (European 
Council 2009:11) 
 Towards 2010 and 2011, immigration issues do not appear to be strongly visible 
in the conclusions of the Council. The sheer quantity of references to imperatives within 
the field of migration is less in comparison to the beginning of the decade. In June 2011 
however, with increased migration pressure from North Africa, the Council 
understandably called for the implementation of extraordinary measures (European 
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Council 2011:8). It called for the implementation of, as a last resort, a safeguard clause 
for allowing the exceptional reintroduction of internal border controls in critical 
situations “where a Member State is no longer able to comply with its obligations under 
the Schengen rules” (European Council 2011a:8). The EU Neighbourhood Policies are 
also brought up as a means to enhance cooperation in the Southern and Eastern 
neighborhood. (European Council 2011a:10). More strikingly, the Council has proposed 
for a new tool in affairs with third-countries concerning migration. Named “Mobility 
Partnerships”, the Union will assess partner countries individually in terms of their 
progress and efforts in all areas of migration, and rewards, or funding, granted to the 
states will be conditional on merits earned in the field of migration (European Council 
2011b:10). 
 The European Parliament in turn continued its emphasis on justice and human 
rights in EU migration policy. In June 2007 the European Parliament issued a Report 
titled ‘on an area of freedom, security and justice: Strategy on the external dimension, 
Action Plan implementing the Hague programme’. This report follows the strong 
human rights emphasis and scrutiny of the Council and Commission visible throughout 
the Parliament discourse. The Parliament is again stressing the need for a balanced 
consideration between preservation of internal security and human rights as well as 
justice (European Parliament 2007a:4). Reiterating on the weaknesses of the European 
asylum policy, it questions the use of readmission agreements as a tool in combatting 
illegal immigration. The agreements do not clearly exclude asylum seekers from the 
scope of the agreements and may lead to the principle of non-refoulement being 
compromised (European Parliament 2007a:12). Again the Parliament criticises the 
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Council and Commission for failing to honour the co-decision procedure by not 
consulting the Parliament on matters of JHA (European Parliament 2007a:4). 
The Parliament also touches on an important issue of data protection. This is 
especially controversial with reference to US-EU relations, as the scope of the US 
government exceeds that of the EU, and places less regard on citizen rights (European 
Parliament 2007a:8). The Parliament conveyed a clear view on the matter: 
 “Expresses its deep concern at the inadequate legal safeguards for EU citizens in 
 cases of personal data being made available to third countries, notably in cases 
 such as PNR, SWIFT and the collection of telecommunication records by the 
 FBI; reiterates its request to the Commission to carry out an inquiry into which 
 categories of personal data of European citizens are being accessed and used by 
 third countries in their own jurisdictions; stresses that data-sharing must take 
 place on a proper legal basis, with clear rules and criteria, in line with European 
 legislation on the adequate protection of privacy and civil liberties; believes that 
 data sharing with the US must take place in the proper legal context for 
 transatlantic cooperation, and on the basis of EU-US agreements, while bilateral 
 agreements are not acceptable” (European Parliament 2007a:8) 
 Cooperation with third-countries was a continuous topic in Council Conclusions 
in terms of contributing to the problems faced by the Union from illegal immigration. 
The Parliament also addresses the topic but from a slightly different angle. The 
Parliament urges the Commission to include human rights considerations to third-
country dialogue and stress issues of good governance and democracy (European 
Parliament 2007a:15).  
 In September 2007, the Parliament issued a report focusing on policy priorities 
in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country nationals. Even though the 
report is on illegal immigration, the Parliament takes a wholly different approach to the 
topic. Rather than emphasising border reinforcements and law enforcement measures, 
the Parliament stressed the need to study the root causes of migration (European 
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Parliament 2007b:7). Within this context, the Parliament applauds some member states 
on linking immigration with development agreements with various African countries 
(European Parliament 2007b:9). Such practise is encouraged to be expanded through 
out the Union. The Parliament also repeated its opposition to forming detention centres 
for illegal migrants and asylum seekers outside EU’s borders (European Parliament 
2007b:8). There are obvious human rights concerns if such practise would be 
formalized. Moreover, the Committee on Civil Liberties of the Parliament has observed 
on the ground the conditions of detention centres within the EU and stated being 
“shocked by the inhumane conditions” (European Parliament 2007b:8). Hence the role 
of the Parliament as keeping the Council and the Commission “in-check” is very clear. 
 From the Council Conclusions the portrayal of illegal immigration as a threat on 
the security of EU citizens was evident. The language used when describing illegal 
immigration is something that the Parliament also intervenes in. It rightly states that the 
way in which illegal immigration is presented to the people influences the perceptions 
of the society, and it is especially the role of the EU to transmit vales of solidarity and 
tolerance to the public, rather than those of discrimination and xenophobia (European 
Parliament 2007b:8). 
 With reference to the development of Frontex and EUROSUR, the Parliament 
issued a report in November 2008 and is seemingly positive concerning its mandate on 
monitoring the external borders of Europe. It considers the agency to be an “essential 
instrument in the Union's global strategy on immigration and calls on the Commission 
to present proposals to review the mandate of the Agency in order to strengthen its role 
and make it more effective” (European Parliament 2008:6). It is not critical nor does it 
highlight any questionable aspects of its operation. Quite the opposite, it calls for 
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permanent operational surveillance to be established in high –risk areas (European 
Parliament 2008:6). In this sense, the Parliament most likely views Frontex as a tool 
saving lives at sea rather than deterring asylum seekers from claiming for international 
protection. Similar to the Council, the Parliament emphasizes the need for a higher 
cooperation with third-countries through negotiating readmission agreements and 
“considers that immigration should be an intrinsic part of any negotiations of 
agreements with third countries which are countries of origin or countries of transit” 
(European Parliament 2008:7). However a stark contrast to the Council opinion, the 
Parliament does not view making cooperation with third-countries conditional as 
justified. 
  In terms of counter-terrorism measures the Parliament issued a report in July 
2011 titled ‘on the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy: main achievements and future 
challenges’. In contrast to the approach of the Council and the Commission, the 
Parliament does not make any reference to immigration or asylum in the context of anti-
terrorism. As a matter of fact it states that the Commission should clearly outline, 
“which measures have objectives other than counter-terrorism, or where further 
objectives were added to the initial purpose of counter-terrorism (mission creep and 
function creep), such as law enforcement, immigration policies, public health or public 
order” (European Parliament 2011:12). Hence the Parliament is addressing here the 
obvious blurring between migration and anti-terrorism policies. 
 
	  
4.4 - Conclusion: The Council vs. The Parliament – An internal power 
struggle 
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Overall, in the discussions of the Council the same themes appear to be 
repeating irrespective of the time period. Erecting barriers to entry and policing the 
borders of the Union are reoccurring themes in the content of the Meeting Conclusions. 
Persistent emphasis is given to the external dimension or externalization of Union 
immigration control. Migration issues are clearly incorporated into the foreign policy of 
the EU to the extent that cooperation on matters of migration and asylum are 
conditional for other development and commercial objectives. There is an evident 
merging of foreign policy objectives and migration objectives of the EU.  
 Corresponding with the definitions of securitization, immigration issues are 
brought up in the context of internal security and more specifically anti-terrorism issues. 
It appears that discussions on the security of the people of the EU must involve 
discussions on migration policy objectives of the Council also. Surprisingly, asylum 
issues and human rights concerns are given relatively little focus in comparison to the 
quantity of discussion involving illegal immigration imperatives. The focus of the 
Council is clearly on issues of internal security, which is directly dependent on an 
efficient and joint EU effort in the field of migration. Essentially, immigration is 
portrayed as a threat rather than an opportunity, the economic benefits of which are left 
to be discussed by member states themselves.  
 The European Parliament however has overall adopted a different outlook to 
immigration. Rather than viewing it as an obvious problem for the Union, it reminds the 
Council and the Commission on the opportunities and responsibilities. Especially in 
terms of asylum policy, the Parliament consistently reminds the Council of the trade-off 
between excessive focus on internal security and human rights considerations. 
Furthermore, the Parliament places far more emphasis on development objective and 
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addressing the roots causes of migration. This does not however mean that the 
Parliament intends the development to exist independently without security measures at 
the external borders. More so, it enforces the two to be developed in parallel, as neither 
can be effective on their own.  
 The content of the Reports do however show some indication that the securitized 
rhetoric has reached the Parliament also. References to the enlargement of the Union 
constituting a threat at the borders and the role of curbing illegal immigration in keeping 
the citizens of the EU safe imply that securitization has been normalized in immigration 
policy to the extent that it is firmly rooted in the institutions of the EU. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 - The institutionalization of securitization 
 
This thesis has aimed to examine the extent of securitization in EU immigration 
and asylum policy, and more specifically how the concept of securitization is apparent 
in both the policy and discourse of the EU. By examining the existing literature on 
securitization, the research illustrated how politicians through speech acts portray a 
policy area as one related to the security of the state and hence survival. By framing a 
direct relationship between the two, the issue is processed only within the context of 
security hence justifying more extreme and often anti-democratic measures in defense 
of the security of the state and its citizens. As illustrated, securitization is established 
through speech. However, overtime the security association, if successfully acted, can 
lead to securitization being institutionalized into administrative and procedural routines. 
This is a result of the securitization aspect already being taken for granted and no longer 
questioned by the public. Such successful securitization implies power on the part of the 
political actors and bureaucracies, leading to the unquestioned application of the 
securitized mindset. 
Within the field of immigration such securitization has long roots in framing 
TCNs as a threat to the security of the citizens of Europe. However, as the literature 
illustrates, the justification for such securitization has slightly shifted from emphasis on 
socio-economic problems to terrorist threats. With the events of 9/11 and attacks in 
Europe a few years later, the EU was faced with new realities from threats unpredictable 
and volatile in nature. For some authors, this marked a new era in EU immigration 
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policies, one of building the walls of fortress Europe and deterring by all means the 
entry of the foreigner threatening the very liberties defended by the EU. For others, 
these new realities brought little new in terms of policy responses. The securitization of 
immigration is claimed to have roots in the very rational behind the formation of the 
Schengen Agreement and as such is a longstanding objective of the Union. In fact, it is 
the best means to increase the unity within Europe, by focusing attention on the threat 
from the outside. In terms of such externalization of threat, the link between TCNs and 
terrorists is more explicitly made in US migration policy. This logic is followed to the 
extent that a seemingly relaxed attitude towards immigration in Europe is in US 
government policy a probable threat to US security.  
In view of this, the research aimed to examine the extent of securitization within 
the institutional framework of immigration and asylum policy in the EU. The policy 
analysis took on the task of scrutinizing the policy practice of securitization by looking 
at the development of EU secondary legislation pertaining to immigration. According to 
the majority of literature assessed, asylum was a policy area that suffered the most from 
the anti-terrorism hype. Analysis on the developments following 2001 concerning 
qualification for international protection and safeguarding basic rights of asylum 
seekers reveals that there is an increasing trend of attempting to erode the rights of 
TCNs under exclusionary clauses, in most cases relating to national security and public 
order. References to national security are frequent and present loopholes for member 
states to apply Directives at their discretion. Law enforcement officers are given wider 
scope and authority in dealing with asylum applications with little regard or knowledge 
of central rights of the asylum seekers. However there is evidence of a healthy 
evaluation and a responsive system in the formulation of the policies as well. Due to the 
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institutional setting of the Union bodies, no one institution has monopoly over the 
formation of legislation hence appropriate checks and balances are present to oversee 
the legislative procedure.  
The reinforcement of the external borders of the Union presented another area of 
scrutiny. The scope of measures taken at the external borders of the EU to deter illegal 
entries is immense. Harmonized policies have been developed to form a united response 
and more specifically a clear legal framework for the expulsion of TCNs on EU soil. 
Detention, expulsion and entry bans are standard operating procedures for getting rid of 
TCNs. Moreover, the Union has created special forces such as Europol, Frontex and 
RABIT at the borders to patrol and prevent TCNs entry. The financial and legislative 
freedom granted to these organs is telling. What is more striking is the pushing of 
borders of the EU even further by engaging in cooperation with third-countries to 
prevent TCNs even reaching the shores of Europe. Third-countries are coerced into 
cooperation with Europe with incentives and pressure in other fields besides 
immigration. Migration clauses are negotiated into all types of agreements with 
neighboring third-countries for easier repatriation and lesser responsibility on the part of 
the EU.  
Another field, which illustrated considerable development, is technological 
solutions and the formation of various databases for storing and monitoring of TCNs. 
The previous decade has witnessed sophisticated information gathering in visas, asylum 
applications and the collection of biometric data and masses of information concerning 
would-be entries to the EU. The development of such tools is clearly justifiable as an 
administrative necessity but what is more questionable is the obvious instrumental 
blurring in their use for both immigration and law enforcement purposes. National law 
	   73	  
enforcement personnel as well as the above mentioned security forces of the Union 
have near unrestricted access to these databases, especially under the pretext of national 
security, hence leading to the labeling of TCNs and jeopardizing of basic human rights. 
VIS and Eurodac data are used interchangeably for immigration and law enforcement 
purposes with little regard to data protection. More strikingly, these systems are 
developed with specific regions and nationalities in mind as posing the greatest threat to 
internal security. The legislative analysis showed that there is political will in pushing 
the collecting even further by taking DNA samples and gathering behavioral data from 
commercial transactions related to air ticket purchases. Albeit not yet approved in the 
EU, the worrying trend is already visible in the US, which in terms of overseas travel 
already has ramifications for EU citizens.  
However, is this all new or an expected development going along side EU 
enlargement? SIS and Eurodac both pre date 2001 as does the establishment of Europol. 
The will and need has obviously been there for their establishment, and understandably 
once the territory of the EU expands, so does the need to protect it. However, to take it 
to such an extreme where human rights obligations are being neglected is highly 
questionable, as is the apparent prevailing logic that a TCN equals a threat. As stated, 
the most unlikely means of entry to the Union for a menace to the security is an asylum 
seeker who subjects himself/herself to such a lengthy and bureaucratic procedure when 
entering the EU.  
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5.2 - Discourse: Is securitization prevailing?  
	  
 The research then focused on the rhetoric used by two main bodies of the Union, 
the Parliament and the Council in search of the roots for the securitization apparent in 
the policy. The Council and Parliament offered two remarkably different approaches to 
the topic. Throughout, the Council focused its immigration discourse around the threat 
from illegal immigration and the security of citizen of the EU. Measures of border 
reinforcement, development of databases and empowering border agencies were central 
themes throughout the decade. The Parliament on the other hand, offered a firm defense 
for rights of persons in need of international protection. It reiterated concerns from the 
use of data on TCNs for law enforcement purposes and the overall blurring of anti-
terrorism and immigration tools. Whereas both strongly supported cooperation with 
transit and origin countries, the Parliament had a developmental perspective whilst the 
Council insisted cooperation in the field of migration to be conditional for all other 
forms of assistance.  
 A surprising finding however was that the terrorist attacks on both Madrid and 
London did not appear to influence the tone of discourse for either body. Whereas the 
Council did mention issues of immigration to considerations under the European 
response to terrorism, the Parliament merely warned of crossing the line of ensuring 
internal security on the expense of justice and human rights. But neither showed a 
marked change in policy or language or way in which immigration issues were framed. 
The Council kept its relatively securitized rhetoric and perception that immigration is 
best combatted through an impenetrable border with minimal human rights obligations. 
Although showing some signs of externalizing the threat, the Parliament remained 
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defending the rights of TCNs, acted as a check against excessive measures and 
remained a watchdog on the actions of the Council in general. 
 
 
5.3 - Securitization: A political choice or a necessity for survival? 
 
Hence, when looking at the extent of securitization in the European Union 
immigration and asylum policy, it is fair to say that the rhetoric of externalizing the 
threat has penetrated the institutional framework and has been normalized into policy 
practice. There is a clear push towards a “race to the bottom” on obligations towards 
non-EU citizens. Loyalties toward the people residing in Europe are prioritized over 
those needing international protection, or at least this is the pretext given. Is the safety 
of EU nationals at risk to such extent that the Union shows clear signs of backing out of 
being the shining example of human rights and democratic practices everywhere? This 
is what the political force behind the EU would like us to believe. As long as the source 
and means of entry of terrorists and other menaces to the security of Europe remains 
vague and difficult to identify, there appears to be little option but to trust those at the 
highest bureaucratic level of the EU. And this exactly manifests the workings of 
securitization in practice; an idea presented to us, the audience, by those possessing the 
knowledge and the power to frame an issue in a manner which suites their objectives. 
However, such policy development appears logical looking at the growth of the 
EU. The harmonization of policies may have started from trade and economics but the 
leaps made since require extensive harmonization across all fields, including that of 
immigration, for the realization of economic prosperity and freedoms protected by the 
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EU. Indeed, the securitization aspect witnessed especially in the field of asylum can be 
explained, according to some, as a result of the goals announced at the Tampere 
Conclusions. However, harmonization needn’t be synonymous with securitization. A 
clear blurring of boundaries between immigration control and crime control is highly 
controversial. Constant parallels are drawn between the removal of TCNs and issues of 
national security. Is such a simple conclusion warranted that national security concerns 
are able to dictate policy formation in the field of immigration and asylum? 
Unmistakably, the world today is not what it was 10 years ago, and even less what it 
was when the Treaty of Rome was signed. One cannot blame the EU for responding to 
the challenges brought by globalization. However, one can blame it for going too far.  
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